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ABSTRACT 
In 2007, the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged 
after the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) aligned itself with Al-Qaeda. 
This development captured the world’s attention and led several scholars and 
policymakers to ask the question:  Why did this merger take place and what does it say 
about the motivations of GSPC? This research investigates three hypotheses: (1) This 
merger is merely an ideological one without operational implications; (2) this merger is 
ideological, operational, and logistical; or (3) this merger is merely a rebranding of a 
failing organization that needed to survive and, therefore, is not a genuine threat to the 
United States and its European allies. Exploring the evolution of Algerian Islamism, from 
the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) to the 
GSPC and AQIM, this study concludes that hypothesis 3 is the best explanation of the 
merger between GSPC and Al-Qaeda. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamic du Salut or FIS, as known by its 
French acronym), was formed and legalized as a political party in Algeria in 1989.  In 
1990 and 1991, the FIS won both local and regional elections.  The group was poised for 
sweeping legislative victories in the National Assembly when the military nullified the 
elections in January 1992. The FIS was systematically repressed by the Algerian military 
regime, and went underground as a result. After the elections were canceled and the FIS 
leaders had been arrested, a new organization, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA, Groupe 
Islamique Armé), emerged.  
The GIA was a group made up of former militants who always rejected the idea 
of democratic participation in Algerian politics. Subsequently, it conducted a massive and 
deadly insurgency against the military regime. The deadly interactions between the GIA 
and the state resulted in massacres where thousands of civilians perished. The GIA 
experienced a split in 1998 in which a new faction, the Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC), came into existence. More recently, the GSPC changed its name to Al-
Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb land (AQIM). 
This newly vocalized association of the Algerian radical group to Al-Qaeda leads 
to some important questions: What are the origins of AQIM? Why did the GSPC 
transform itself from a national organization to a regional and global one, committed to 
the agenda of Al-Qaeda? What motivated this shift? How significant is the strategic re-
orientation? Is this a change of strategy or a mere re-branding for the sake of reviving a 
dying terrorist group? What is the level of threat the AQIM poses to the United States and 
the Western world in general? 
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B. IMPORTANCE 
Prior to 9/11, the United States viewed North Africa as a region of secondary 
importance, despite some threats such as Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian citizen whose 1999 
plan to bomb the Los Angeles Airport failed.1 Ressam was later identified as part of the 
Montréal Headquarters of the GIA terrorist cell. However, the U.S. policy makers did not 
realize the AQIM threat until after the New York Times interviewed the AQIM leader, 
who declared that the foreigners’ interests (mainly U.S.) were under threat because they 
were supporting the Algerian regime. Thus, after the publication of the AQIM leader 
interview by the New York Times in July 2008,2 Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates 
expressed that the merger of Al-Qaeda with the Algeria organization and others like it 
brought fresh risks. 
European leaders also considered themselves under threat due to the presence of 
the important Algerian communities in their respective countries. The European 
counterterrorism coordinator Gilles de Kerchove noted that Europe faces a real threat,3 
and Guidere Mathieu mentioned that Al-Qaeda has brought terrorism to the doors of 
Europe.4 
According to the U.S. and other Western countries, focusing on the Maghreb 
makes strategic sense for Al-Qaeda because the region has a long history of militant 
Islamism and of people struggling against neocolonialism and “apostate” rulers. 
Moreover, there is a geographic proximity to Europe, and many North Africans have 
close liaisons to Europe and North America via their friends and families residing in large 
North African communities in France, Holland, Italy and Canada. That proximity makes 
the region a great springboard, not only for operatives looking to carry out strikes in 
Europe or in North America, but also to unify and radicalize the large North African 
                                                 
1 Ely Karmon, Coalitions between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, Nationalists and Islamists 
(Leiden, Netherlands: Martnus Nijhoff, 2005), 338. 
2 An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal in the New York Times on July 2008.  
3 Karmon, Coalitions Between Terrorist Organizations, 338. 
4 Mathieu Guidere, Al-Qaeda a la Conquête du Maghreb, le Terrorisme aux Portes de l’Europe, 
(Monaco: Rocher, 2007). 
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or in North America, but also to unify and radicalize the large North African 
communities on the continent. These communities can act either as support networks or 
as camouflage for radical operatives. 
Given these risks, it is vitally important to understand the origins of the AQIM 
and to assess its potential to grow and threaten the U.S., regional allies and the European 
Union. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Experts on AQIM disagree as to what motivated the GSPC to merge with Al-
Qaeda. Some argue that this is a genuine merger based on ideological affinity. Others 
argue that this is a mere re-branding of a failed organization, but it is still one that is 
focused on Algeria. According to Karmon, the coalition between radical organizations 
such as Al-Qaeda and GSPC could be “ideological, material and operational 
cooperation.”5 He defined the cited possible links as follows: 
 Ideological cooperation involves the affirmation of a specific 
worldview or identity through the publication of documentations and 
leaflets that declare similar beliefs and operational goals. 
 Logistical cooperation is expressed through the provision of resources 
such as financial assistance, weapons and ammunition, printing 
presses, forged documents, and operation manuals. 
 Operational cooperation manifests in many forms, including the 
provision of military training in the organization’s camps; sharing 
tactical information, safe houses, and escape routes; conducting attacks 
(solely or jointly) against targets; and seeking the release of jailed 
members of the other organization.  
The core debate on the coalition of GSPC and Al-Qaeda is between those who 
argue that the motivation behind the formation of AQIM is related to a local struggle 
between Algerian Islamists and their state, versus those who see it as a global or 
                                                 
5 Karmon, Coalitions Between Terrorist Organizations, 7. 
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transnational threat relating to the globalization of terrorism and the ideological appeal of 
the Al-Qaeda organization led by Usama bin Laden.6   
According to Anneli Botha’s argument, the GSPC in Algeria aligned itself 
officially with Al-Qaeda during 2007. In this case, one might argue that this group 
realized that the initial strategy of changing the political system and replacing it with a 
true Islamic government could not be realized. In order to justify their existence, it had to 
adapt to a transnational philosophy and agenda. She also explained that “Ayman Al-
Zawahiri,” believed to be second in command of Al-Qaeda, said on 3 November 2007, 
Islamic nations of resistance and jihad (holy war) in the Maghreb see how 
your children are uniting under the banner of Islam and jihad against the 
United States, France and Spain. Your children in fighting our enemies 
and cleansing our lands of their slaves Moamer Kadhafi, Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali, Abdelaziz Bouteflika and King Mohammed VI.7 
Anneli Botha argues that while AQIM is continuing with its domestic campaign, 
its focus also includes Western interests in the region. According to her, it remains 
doubtful that Al-Qaeda has any direct operational link with the AQIM in which all 
operations must first be sanctioned by the Al-Qaeda leadership. It probably has an 
ideological link without being expressly revealed. 
According to Jebnoun, the North African area could be the second Afghanistan of 
Africa. The AQIM fighters have certainly joined Iraq’s insurgency and have become 
highly skilled in urban operations. He mentioned also that the GSPC changed its name to 
be “the Al-Qaeda organization in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM) in 2006 and quickly 
demonstrated that it had a link with Al-Qaeda.  
Further, Jebnoun argues that when the different attacks, which occurred in the 
Maghreb region are examined, no evidence confirms that the attacks were ordered and 
organized by the same organization, “These speculations do not withstand critical 
                                                 
6 Jonathan Schanzer, Al-Qaida’s Armies; Middle East Affiliate Groups & the Next Generation of 
Terror (New York: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 156. 
7 Anneli Botha, Terrorism in the Maghreb: the Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism (Pretoria, 
South Africa: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 204. 
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analysis and empirical evidence, however. A number of factors nullify the hypothesis that 
the attacks were coordinated by the same organization.” 8 
Jebnoun’s conclusions appear to be based on his personal knowledge and open 
resources, and he was in doubt that AQIM was linked with Al-Qaeda. 
According to Luis Martinez, the GSPC, then AQIM is considered close to Al-
Qaeda in its orientation by its capability to use the networks in foreign countries for its 
logistical operations. In this case, the author did not clarify whether the networks 
mentioned in his statement belonged either to Al-Qaeda or to AQIM. 
Hadjira, noted that about one year ago, Pakistani terrorists came to train in AQIM 
training camps and may have contributed to the production of biological agents.9  He 
added that the Washington Times mentioned an intercepted communication between 
AQIM leaders and AQ Central in Pakistan relating to this event. 
In addition, the author noted that AQIM was “hired” by AQ central, mostly 
because of its extensive network in Europe that could allow a strike in Europe at some 
point. The leadership of AQIM has been under intense pressure to attack European 
targets in order to maintain the group’s credibility. In fact, by not using a “conventional” 
weapon, AQIM would prove its value to AQ Central. If the group was indeed developing 
a biological weapon, it was probably destined for delivery in Europe and most likely in 
France.  
According to Andrew Black, all the information related to the different operations 
carried out by AQIM between March 2005 and March 2008 was based on what was 
published in different open sources. He argued that targeting of the international assets in 
Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania had increased since September 2007, the same month in 
which Al-Qaeda’s deputy leader called for expelling Western influence from the 
Maghreb.10 He refers the attack on the UN building in Algiers in December 2007, and 
                                                 
8 Jebnoun, “Is the Maghreb the Next Afghanistan?: Mapping the Radicalization of the Algerian Salafi 
Jihadist Movement”  Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (2007): 1–36. 
 9 Olivier Guitta, “Al- Qaeda and the Plague” in Middle East Times on Tuesday, January 27, 2009.  
10  Andrew Black, “AQIM’s Expanding Internationalist Agenda,” Combating Terrorism Center 1, no. 
5 (April 2008): 12–14. 
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then the February kidnapping of two Austrian tourists in the south of Tunisia to 
demonstrate the escalating emphasis on international targets. The author added that while 
AQIM continues to maintain a strong commitment for targeting the Algerian 
government’s representatives and its security forces, it (AQIM) has a growing ambition 
for targeting international assets in order to be in accordance with Al-Qaeda’s central 
strategy of frightening and threatening the far enemy.11 
Daniel Lav argued12 that before joining Al-Qaeda, the GSPC had developed 
extensive ties with other North African jihad groups, especially in Morocco, “Other 
recent developments include the trial of the Moroccan group Jama’at Al-Tawhid W’AL –
Jihad, which is believed to have ties to the GSPC.”13 He added that the Moroccan group 
was perceived to be capable of manufacturing a remote-controlled bomb detonated by 
cellular phone. 
In September 2006, Al-Qaeda officially announced that the GSPC had adjoined 
its network. After the GSPC changed its name to Al-Qaeda organization in Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) in January 2007, the AQIM demonstrated similar global Jihadi tactics 
as used by Al-Qaeda. The AQIM carried out many synchronized suicide bombings 
against the Algerian security and military forces. 
These operations were followed up with video statements on radical Web sites to 
display their operational capacity to the entire world. In addition to its bloody operations 
against the Algerian targets, AQIM attacked foreigners’ assets in Algeria, such as an 
attack against U.S. oil conglomerate Halliburton in a western suburb of Algiers. Besides 
the attacks that occurred inside Algeria, another clash took place in Tunisia between the 
security forces and a Tunisian group led by an Afghanistan veteran and a former 
policeman in January 2007. On April 8, 2007, a group of nine Algerian soldiers died 
                                                 
11 Black, “AQIM’s Expanding Internationalist Agenda,” 13. 
12 Daniel Lav, “The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb: The Evolving Terrorist Presence 
in North Africa,” The Middle East Media Research Institute no. 332 (March 7, 2007), 
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA33207 (accessed January 27, 2009). 
13 Ibid. 
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during an ambush of a military patrol. After three days, AQIM carried out a bloody 
operation that killed 33 persons and wounded more than 200. 
On the other side of Algeria, a terrorist strike was carried out in Casablanca 
(Morocco) and killed three persons. After all these operations, the AQIM leader (Abou 
Moussab Abdel Wadoud) in an interview with the New York Times in July 2008 
confirmed that an association with Al-Qaeda Central was already realized, and his 
organization’s objectives were to attack within the region and globally follow the Al-
Qaeda’s strategy of targeting the “far enemy.”14 
The AQIM leader’s interview with New York Times, following the different 
attacks carried out, started a debate between those seeing that AQIM was a regional 
threat and the others who tried to convince themselves and their readers that the AQIM 
goal was global.  
The author’s analyses were based essentially on open resources especially local 
media under the government control. It is likely that the media minimized the data and 
did not let the readers evaluate the threat objectively. Therefore, the above arguments and 
counter arguments are based on speculation, since there is no evidence supporting their 
ideas.  
The goal in this thesis is to analyze the different data that motivated the GSPC to 
shift its name to AQIM. After that motivation has been determined, the existence or not 
of any ideological, operational or logistical link between AQIM and the different radical 
groups within the Maghreb then between AQIM and Al-Qaeda can be evaluated and 
confirmed, or discounted.  
D. HYPOTHESES AND PROBLEMS 
This study explores the emergence of AQIM through the prism of Karmon’s 
three-fold division of ideological, operational, and material cooperation.15 
                                                 
14 Black, “AQIM’s Expanding Internationalist Agenda,” 12–14. 
15 Karmon, Coalitions Between Terrorist Organizations. 
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Hypothesis 1: AQIM is only an ideological merger between GSPC and Al-Qaeda 
expressed by the publication of documentations and leaflets, a declaration of identical 
ideological and operational goals, but not an operational and logistical support because 
the GSPC has its preexisting networks, cadres, and leaders, and is focused on its fight 
with the Algerian state. It still operates locally and regionally, not globally, and most of 
its targets remain in North Africa. 
Hypothesis 2: AQIM is a major threat to the United States and its European allies 
because its merger with Al-Qaeda is ideological, operational, and material. This merger 
constitutes a major transformation of a local extremist group into a transnational one with 
a new identity, objective, and target set.   
Hypothesis 3: AQIM is not a major threat to the United States and its European allies 
because its merger with Al-Qaeda is a mere rebranding of a local extremist organization 
driven by the need to bolster its failing struggle against powerful Algerian states. This 
merger does not reflect an actual desire by Algerian Islamists to transform themselves 
from local insurgents into global jihadists.  
What facts are there for each of these hypotheses? What is the required evidence 
necessary to substantiate or disconfirm each of these hypotheses? 
The Algerian issue emerged before the 1990s, when the Algerian government, 
under the former president Chadli Ben Jedid, allowed the FIS (Front Islamic du Salut) to 
become a political party. After its clear success in local and legislative elections, it was 
then banned and repressed by the military power. After those election results were 
cancelled and the group (FIS) was repressed, it went underground and became violent.  
The group structure and leadership have changed many times to reflect its militancy and 
its challenge to the governmental desire to suppress this terrorist group. The GIA 
emerged out of this group as the army wing, while some other FIS followers tried to seek 
a peaceful political process. The GIA was accused of civilian massacres that occurred in 
Algeria.  Several complaints accused the government of being behind the massacres and 
then blaming the GIA in order to tarnish and undermine its image. The government also 
faced an increasingly disapproving international opinion that accused it of human rights 
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violations. To avoid any kind of the Algerian government accusations, the majority of the 
GIA members formed a new group and named it GSPC declaring that it was targeting 
only the Algerian government’s representatives and its security forces.  The GSPC 
members were reduced as a result of the Algerian government’s continuous repression. 
The group (GSPC) started to look for external regional support perceiving a better 
chance for survival if the GSPC aligned with Al-Qaeda central’s leadership and shifted 
its name to the Al-Qaeda organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The name change 
and the declaration of a coalition with Al-Qaeda led many observers to inquire about the 
motivations behind this strategy.  
 The available academic studies seem not to cover the whole issue regarding the 
interaction between the GSPC and the Algerian government. The literature appears not 
well linked with the reality of the actual situation because of the absence of security and 
the secrecy of the GSPC. This makes it difficult to conduct relevant research on this 
group’s   activities and ambitions. 
In addition, many of the available academic articles have been based on 
diplomatic interviews with interested leaders. The leader of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb AQIM, Abdelmalek Droukdal, was interviewed by The New York Times. 
During this interview, the AQIM leader threatened the West’s interests, especially the 
French and U.S. interests in Algeria, the Maghreb countries, and then in the entire region: 
If the U.S. administration sees that its war against the Muslims is 
legitimate, then what makes us believe that our war on its territories is not 
legitimate? Everyone must know that we will not hesitate in targeting it 
whenever we can and wherever it is on this planet. We say to the 
American people who are driven to more catastrophes by the Bush 
administration: If you are truly looking for your security and safety then 
listens carefully to the speeches of our sheik and emir, Osama bin 
Laden.16 
                                                 
16 Souad Mekhennet, Michael Moss, Eric Schmitt, Elaine Sciolino and Margot Williams, “Ragtag 
Insurgency Gains a Lifeline from Al Qaeda,” The New York Times, July 1, 2008. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01algeria.html?_r=2&ref=africa, (accessed January 27, 
2009). 
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Research should cover the entire region in order to provide credible information 
related to the local situation and its dynamics. Based upon such comprehensive 
information, a better understanding of all the different actors in the region, such as the 
radical groups and their respective governments, will be more objective. Currently, only 
superficial information is available to try to analyze the situation in Algeria with AQIM, 
in Morocco with GICM, in Tunisia with MTI and in Libya with LIFG. It is beneficial for 
analysis to conduct field surveys to better understand the situation. This author argues 
that this type of research requires someone who has been closer to the radical group’s 
area or who knows as much as possible about the current events in the region, in order to 
come up with relevant information and understanding of the nuances of communication 
in the culture and languages of the region. This is missing in the field now. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis is a qualitative study of the genealogy of AQIM beginning with the 
rise of the FIS and GIA to the emergence of the GSPC and AQIM. It seeks to trace the 
process by which radical Islamism has evolved and its linkages to external Jihadism. At 
each step, it seeks to determine what motivated the change in strategy and organizational 
structure to determine if AQIM’s current trajectory is in line with its predecessors or is a 
complete departure from the groups that came before it. 
The research will focus on Algeria where the main radical group in North Africa 
has been active. The research will also analyze the radical presence, evolution and 
activities from a time period just prior to Algerian independence up to the present with 
special focus on the main period of interaction between the radical group and the 
Algerian regime from 1992 to the present. 
Through this research, the author will examine, analyze, then propose what could 
be the main or real link between Al-Qaeda central under “Ben Laden” and AQIM under 
its leader Abdelmalek Droukdal. 
Secondly, this thesis will examine the link between  the previous Algerian radical 
group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and the other groups in 
North Africa and the sub Sahara  region, such as the Moroccan Islamic Combat  Group 
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MICG (as known by its French acronym GICM: Groupe Islamique Combatant au 
Maroc), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group LIFG .  
This analysis will determine the nature of the link between the cited groups: Is the 
association based on ideology, logistics or operational links? 
By this research, the author will clarify the different data issued or published 
concerning the global threat of AQIM, mainly the operations carried out in North Africa 
and Europe in 2007. This study will then define the AQIM’s threat level. Various 
available data such as articles, books, Web sites, and interviews will be examined and 
analyzed, and cross-reference procedures will be followed. 
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II. HISTORY OF ALGERIAN ISLAMISM 
A. HISTORY OF ALGERIAN ISLAMISM BETWEEN 1962 AND 1988   
During periods of struggle for their independence, several nationalist and 
religious parties in the Arab world faced many contradictions and divergences of tactics, 
yet this was not the case for the Algerians during their revolution against the French 
occupation. The Algerians were led by the National Liberation Front (NLF), well known 
by its French abbreviation FLN (Front de Liberation Nationale). The FLN emanated from 
a popular nationalistic movement that mobilized nearly all the tendencies, including the 
religious activist movement or Salafism, under a common banner of fraternity that 
previously did not have any equivalent in Algeria.  
To better understand the Algerian Salafist movement, it is important to analyze its 
socio-historical element.  Salafism is not a new movement in Algeria. Its roots go back to 
1931 when Sheikh “Abdelhamid ibn Badis,” an influential Algerian Islamic scholar, 
founded the association of `Ulama (jam`iyyat al-`ulama al-muslimin al-jaaza’iriyyin) to 
mobilize his countrymen against the French occupation. The goal was to preserve 
Algerians’ identity, which he perceived was threatened by the so-called French “mission 
civilisatrice,”17 that sought to transfer Algerian traditional Islamic society into a 
European society very similar to the French society. 18  
After its independence in 1962, the Algerian constitution declared Islam the 
religion of the state, and stipulated that the head of state must be a Moslem. These 
principles were reaffirmed in the constitution of 1977.19 The association of Moslem 
Algerians Ulama’s (AOMA: Olamas) veterans were involved in the ministry of religion 
                                                 
17 Jebnoun, “Is the Maghreb the Next Afghanistan?”  
18 Ali Merad, Le Réformisme Musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940 (Paris: Mouton, 1967), 398–399. 
As cited by John Ruedy (ed.), Islamism and Secularism in North Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1994), 76. 
19 “Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page (Islamism in North Africa III),” 
International Crisis Group report no 29 (July 30, 2004), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2884&l=1 (accessed November 3, 2009). 
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and notably in the high Islamic council in the country. They also had important roles to 
play in the educational system, but they did not have a visible presence or influence over 
either the domains of the media or Army. These were under the government’s control.20  
During the presidency of Hauari Boumediane from 1965 up to 1978, the Islamic 
activists were not satisfied with the government’s tendency to be socialistic instead of 
applying Islamic “Shari’a” law. Yet, Islamic activists did not resort to violence to exhibit 
their opinions until the 1980s. 
During the Chadli Ben Jedid presidency (1979–1988), the first Islamic armed 
movement (named Black October movement)21 was formed by the Algerian Islamic 
Movement (Mouvement Islamique Algerien, MIA) 22 and led by Mustapha Bouali. This 
group (MIA) started their struggle against the Ben Jedid regime by stealing a number of 
rifles, weapons, and explosives from a military arms installation before leaving for the 
mountains. 23  
B. THE IMPACT OF THE AFGHANISTAN THEATER ON ALGERIAN 
SOCIETY (1979–1989) 
In 1979, the young people of Algeria were galvanized by the successful Iranian 
revolution and were led to believe that they could achieve their own objective of 
establishing an Islamic state through revolution. In December 1979, the Afghanistan war 
against the Soviet invasion was underway.24 This war against the Soviet Union 
galvanized the youth throughout the Muslim world.  
Besides Saudi Arabia, many Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Algeria, 
encouraged their youth to take part in that war.25 So, after receiving the clearance from 
                                                 
20 Hugh Roberts, “North African Islamism in the Building Light of 9-11,” London School of 
Economics, Development Research Centre, and Working Paper (1st series) no. 34, (October 2003): 23–24. 
21 Jebnoun, “Is the Maghreb the Next Afghanistan?” 
22 “Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria.” 
23 Evan F. Kohlmann, “Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: the GIA, the GSPC and Al-QAEDA,” The 
NEFA Foundation, May 2007, http://www.nefaffoundation.org-info@nefaffoundation (accessed May 
2009). 
24 Guidere, Al-Qaeda A La  Conquête Du Maghreb.    
25 Ibid., 17. 
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their respective countries, several groups from the Middle East, North Africa, and 
especially from Algeria embarked for their destination in Pakistan. The greatest numbers 
of North African Mujahidin were Algerians. “At the end of 1980, between 3,000 and 
4,000 Algerians went through training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.”26 By end of 
the Afghani’s war, the Algerian government suspected that about 1,500 fighters returned 
to Algeria.27 Many of them entered the country illegally, perhaps to keep themselves 
under the security forces’ radar. These Algerian Afghans found themselves jobless and 
disenfranchised; in addition, they had become so influenced by their journey in 
Afghanistan that they continued to wear the Afghanis’ uniform.28  
During this period in Algeria, the Algerian Islamist movements appeared as 
several variants, among them the Salafist tradition and the Muslim Brothers.29 The 
Algerian regime believed that none of the mentioned groups presented a real threat or 
could challenge the regime party (FLN). A new group formed; the “Islamic Salvation 
Front,” known in French as FIS (Front Islamique de Salut), was made up of members 
related to the Salafiya, several of whom took part in the Afghani’s war.  
C. THE RISE OF THE FIS (ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT) AS A 
POLITICAL PARTY 
By the end of the 1980s, the Algerian state was facing a recession and a weak 
labor market that could not respond to the Algerian youths’ ambitions.30 In addition, the 
Algerian regime was not promoting any of the values leading to a collective identity, 
unlike during its predecessor under Boumédiène.31  Therefore, in order to overcome a 
probable crisis and a growing frustration, especially after the rise of a powerful Islamist 
movement, the administration of the President Chadli Ben Jedid decided to open up the 
                                                 
26 Botha, Terrorism in the Maghreb. 
27 Ibid., 32. 
28 Camille Al-Tawil, Elharaka Elslamiya Elmoussallaha in Algeria: Mina Alinkadh Ila Aljamaa 
(Beirout Lebanon: Dar Ennahar Publishing, 1998). 
29 “Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria.” 
30  Jebnoun, “Is the Maghreb the Next Afghanistan?” 
31 Merad, Le Réformisme Musulman, 76. 
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political system after being restricted to the unique party NLF: National Liberation 
Front.32 Consequently, the integration of several Islamist movements was allowed into 
the political process, which led to the official rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).33 
The FIS was legalized as a party in September 1989.34  
The FIS won the first communal and regional elections since Algeria’s 
independence in 1962.35 In addition, the FIS also won 188 seats in the first round of the 
legislative elections held on December 26, 1991, while the governing party (NLF) won 
only 18 seats.36 The first results reflected clearly that the FIS would win massively in the 
National Assembly, if the second round took place as scheduled on January 16, 1992. 
Yet, instead keeping the elections as scheduled, the Algerian army forced the president to 
resign and took the power over the state on January 11, 1992.  
It seemed that Army’s high-ranking officers cancelled the elections in order to 
prevent the possible FIS victory, which could change the regime.37 In addition to the 
cancellation of the elections, the Army dissolved the FIS and banned the use of mosques 
by any political parties. Facing that situation, the FIS called for a general strike, which 
was considered by the Algerian regime as a show of force. That situation provoked 
violent clashes with the police forces killing dozens.38 A state of emergency was declared 
by the Algerian regime.39   
The FIS followers were divided in two factions.40  The first faction, considered 
moderate and led by Abbassi Madani, continued to call for a political and peaceful 
solution for the crisis. It later formed its army wing, the Islamic Salvation Army known 
                                                 
32  Jebnoun, “Is the Maghreb the Next Afghanistan?”  
33 Ibid.  
34  Al-Tawil, Elharaka Elslamiya Elmoussallaha in Algeria. 
35 Ibid, 24. 
36 Botha, “Terrorism in the Maghreb,” 29. 
37Jebnoun, “Is the Maghreb the Next Afghanistan?” 
38 Ibid. 
39 “Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria.” 
40 Al-Tawil, Elharaka Elslamiya Elmoussallaha in Algeria. 
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by its French acronym “AIS” (Armee Islamique Du Salut) just for self-protection.  The 
second faction formed the Armed Islamic Group “GIA” (as known by its French 
acronym, Groupe Islamique Armee) and refused any peaceful solution proposed. This 
later faction called all its followers for the Jihad against the regime and claimed its rights 
by the use of all available means, including violence. Violence increased rapidly, and this 
discord became the essence of the Algeria civil war.41 
                                                 
41 Al-Tawil, Elharaka Elslamiya Elmoussallaha in Algeria. 
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III. THE RISE OF THE ALGERIAN RADICAL GROUPS 
A. THE RISE OF THE ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA) 
According to Abu Hamza Al-Masri, the Arab-Afghan’s spokesman in Great 
Britain was formed from a collection of militant groups that had struggled against the 
military government of Algeria.42 In June 1993, the GIA leader “Abdelhak Layada” was 
arrested in Morocco by Moroccan police and delivered to the Algerian regime. On May 
13, 1994, Abdelhak Layada was replaced by Cherif Gousmi (a.k.a. Abou Abdallah 
Ahmed), who was committed to continuing their Jihad against the Algerian regime until 
they overthrew it.43 
According to General Touati of the Algerian Army, there were approximately 
27,000 Islamist fighters in 1993. They enjoyed strong popular support and in 1994, were 
considered capable of overthrowing the regime.44  
Besides the society’s support of the fighters, the Algerian regime realized also 
that an Al-Qaeda center was providing weapons and military equipment to the GIA in 
recognition of the Afghan veterans who still had strong links with Osama Ben Laden, Al-
Qaeda’s leader. This contribution by Al-Qaeda was characterized as “a genuine network 
supplying arms and military equipment to the Algerian guerillas.”45 
Following its specific Jihad (struggle) or commitment already designated during 
their May 13, 1994, meeting, the GIA adopted many interpretations of Islamic Laws 
according to its own criteria and started to kill anyone who criticized the GIA 
organization or did not support its fighters. By 1995, the GIA had kidnapped diplomats, 
such as the Yemeni and Omani ambassadors in Algiers, Mr. Kaassem Askar Jabran and 
Sheikh Helal bin Salem Essiyabi respectively, who were released after about two 
                                                 
42 Kohlmann, “Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria.”   
43 Al-Tawil, Elharaka Elslamiya Elmoussallaha in Algeria. 
44 Luis Martinez.  “Why the Violence in Algeria?” The Journal of North African Studies 9, no. 2 
(2004): 14–27. 
45 Kohlmann, “Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria.” 
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weeks.46 In addition to its kidnapping acts, the GIA was responsible for the deaths of two 
hundred schoolteachers and directors accused of supporting the regime by joining the 
national educational institutions to teach youth or by opening schools to allow the youth 
learn the French culture instead of joining the GIA to overthrow “Hizb Franca” (France 
Party).47 
In addition to the educational institutions, the religious representatives of Muslims 
and Christians were also threatened and killed by the GIA. The other GIA targets were 
the journalists threatened under the Fatwa (interpretation), “who fights us by pen we will 
fight him by the sword.” 48 The GIA killed many women who did not wear the Hijab 
(Head cover), as well as entire families associated with the government, the security or 
the military. 49 
In addition to its indiscriminate killing of local targets, the GIA believed that the 
regime was receiving foreigner support, especially from France, the USA and Russia. 
The GIA issued the following communiqué deemed as necessary to purify Algeria 
through  hunting down all foreigners living or working there.” The GIA has fought all 
Unbelievers of all ethnicities and groups and ordered every Unbeliever to leave these 
lands (Algeria) …Some have heeded the warning, and others refused, so GIA killed 
several of  them, singles and in groups...”50 
The GIA campaign against the foreigners resulted in the assassination of more 
than 90 innocent civilians, most of them French, and many others families were forced to 
leave Algeria. 
The organization targeted the multinational petroleum or gas companies which 
were considered (by the GIA) as the Algerian regime supporters. Accordingly, the GIA 
leader Djamel Zitouni wrote and issued the following communiqué entitled “Voiding 
Excuses and Confusion of All Oil Employees”: 
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It is well known that the oil resources of this land are the largest source of 
revenue for the apostates which they use to fight Mujahedeen and to 
finance their operations ….GIA orders all employees of the oil companies 
to stop work... and those who abide by the order, then he served himself, 
and those who refuse to stop work, then they have intended to fight, and 
have transgressed against themselves, and they will be killed.51 
After issuing the above communiqué, the GIA carried out operations against the 
American oil company “Brown & Root-Condor” in Bouchaoui, on the road between 
Algiers and Zeralda. This operation consisted of attacking a bus carrying U.S. and 
Algerian workers.52  After targeting U.S. workers in the attack, the GIA also killed or 
injured Russians and Ukrainians working in the oil domain with the Russian oil company 
Stroytransgaz.53 
In addition to its terrible actions in Algeria, the GIA continued to threaten the 
Western countries, especially France. The GIA cell known as the “Signatories with 
Blood”54 hijacked an Air France jetliner from the Algiers airport with 171 passengers and 
headed to Paris. However, after convincing the hijackers to get more fuel, the aircraft 
landed at Marseille airport where the French special forces intervened by killing the 
hijackers and releasing the passengers.  The GIA objective in hijacking the jet was to 
claim the release some of their militants or sympathizers such as Sheikh Omar 
Abdurrahman (a.k.a the blind sheikh), arrested in the USA after being accused of 
targeting New York landmarks including the World Trade Center.55  After its failed 
hijacking operation, the GIA kidnapped and then killed four priests (three French and one 
Belgian) as the first act of revenge.  A second revenge-based counter attack against 
France took place in 1995 with several explosives operations in Paris in which many 
persons were killed or wounded. 56  Furthermore, while Zitouni, as the GIA leader, 
continued to admire his counter-attacking efforts in France, his members also kidnapped 
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seven French monks residing in the Medea region of Algeria and demanded the release of 
the GIA’s previous leader; Abdel Haq was still jailed by the Algerian regime. But after 
the French government refused any negotiation with the GIA, the monks were killed 
without any mercy. 
After these operations against both locals and foreigners, many of the GIA’s 
militants or supporters decided to pull out and denounced the GIA attitude. In retaliation, 
the GIA leader started to kill his former members and their families, such as the Libyan 
Group for Combat leader (Abou Sakhar Al-liby), and Essaid and Rajjam from another 
Algerian group named Al-Jazara.  The killings were undertaken because the victims 
refused the GIA leader’s ferocity. But from the GIA’s perspective, the victims were 
accused of drifting from the right path, and the leader ordered his fighters to counter any 
call for reconciliation with the Algerian regime, “Mujahedeen never felt a day of truce 
with those apostates who sold out their religion and waged war (on Islam) with 
everything at their hands... it is the cry of No Truce, No Reconciliation and No 
Dialogue...”57 
After Zitouni was killed by some of his former followers, Antar Zouabri took over 
and instead of correcting the previous mistakes by the group, he declared that his group 
was supported only by its local population, and he added that the GIA never needed any 
external support.58He carried out many shameful massacres in several isolated, poor rural 
villages where hundreds of innocent civilians were killed, including the elderly, children 
and women. Indeed, these massacres affected the entire group’s local and foreigners’ 
supporters, and caused the entire world, especially the Muslim world, to distance itself 
from the GIA while condemning all of its massacres. Abu Hamza Al-Masri(the Arab-
Afghan’s spokesman in the United Kingdom) commented, “No one at the time believed 
that this could be the work of any Islamic group, even the anti-Muslims themselves, they 
have all agreed that this is the work of the Algerian government, trying to put people off 
from Islam and Islamic ideas.”59 
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By 1997, Zouabri crossed the red line by describing all the Algerian population as 
apostates and hypocrites for not supporting the GIA Jihad against the Algeria regime’s 
repression, and he accepted responsibility for committing all the bloody operations.60 
Consequently, the GIA lost his local and external support after demonstrating extreme 
Takfiri tendencies and being responsible for massacring innocent people.  
The GIA’s previous external support was based on the propaganda distributed by 
the publication Al-Ansar, issued in Great Britain by Abou Mousaab Essouri (Omar 
Abderrahman).61 This publication was important for obtaining funding. Besides the 
propaganda publication, the Libyan Islamic Fighting group (LIFG), following the killing 
of their leader “Sakhar Al-libi” by the GIA previous leader Zitouni, announced that it 
also was halting its alliance and stated that, “After Djamel Zitouni became the leader of 
the group, there was a noticeable change within the group who allowed for itself to kill 
anyone who was not in line with it.”62 Eventually, the struggle appeared to be a battle 
between the movement and the Muslims of Algeria. 
As a consequence, the number of GIA supporters decreased rapidly, and the group 
was affected by the departure and the division of its followers, some of whom formed the 
GSPC (Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat) in 1998, which was perceived to be a 
wiser and an objective group because it conducted only selective operations against the 
Algerian government and security forces members.   Yet the GIA residue continued their 
bloody actions under their leader Zouabri until he was killed close to the Abou Farik 
region in February 2002, by the Algerian security forces.63 According to General Larbi 
Belkhir, the 1990s was a “black decade or a decade wracked by violence, with a death 
toll reaching approximately 150,000.”64 
                                                 
60 Kohlmann, “Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria.” 
61 Lia Brynjar, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 
62 Kohlmann, “Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria.”  
63 Al-Tawil, Elharaka Elslamiya Elmoussallaha in Algeria. 
64 Martinez, “Why the Violence in Algeria?” 14–27. 
 24
B. THE RISE OF GSPC (SALAFIST GROUP FOR PRAYER AND COMBAT) 
OR (AL–JAMAAH AL-SALAFIYYAH LI-AL-DAWAAH WAL QITAL) 
After the GIA collapsed, all the members who had opposed the Antar Zouabri 
leadership gathered in a group and aimed to restore the society’s support. This goal was 
encouraged by the majority of the Algerian Mujahedeen factions, as reported by the Arab-
Afghans who were alarmed by the Jihad collapse in Algeria under the GIA leaders. At 
that time, it was reported that Ben Laden used his satellite phone to contact the GSPC 
leader Abdelmajid Dishu (a.k.a Abu Muab) from Afghanistan and urged him to 
reestablish a better image of jihad in Algeria and the rise of the GSPC name in the 
Muslim world where the name of the GIA was tarnished.65  
It was reported  in March 1999, the GSPC was officially established as a military 
organization in order to continue the struggle against the Algerian apostate regime and its 
supporters by following the Salafist creed and ideology while denouncing all massacres 
committed by the GIA,” The GSPC is a military organization, following the Salafist 
creed and ideology, fighting in jihad against the Algerian regime …to implement Shari’a 
and remove the oppression and humiliation from the shoulders of our oppressed 
brothers.”66 
It was noted that the GSPC expressed that its ambitions would not be limited to its 
local interest but would be extended to other places which could be reached by its 
fighters. The GSPC leader, Hassan Hattab, successfully managed to demonstrate his new 
philosophy as different from the preceding radical group leaders,(Zitouni and Zourabi, 
but he did notachieve any remarkable results in the field.  The GSPC fighters perceived 
that their operations against the apostate regime were weak and limited probably due to 
the lack of national and international support, especially after the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. 
Many analysts realized prior to 9/11, that the Algerian Army, having taken 
advantage of the GSPC weakness, had ‘neutralized’ the threat represented by the radical 
group. At that point, the international community still had not recognized the legitimacy 
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of the Army’s indiscriminate actions against the radical group’s relatives and 
sympathizers.67 Some analysts speculated that the 9/11 attacks would legitimize the 
Algerian army’s repression [a.k.a. the “dirty war”].68 Thus, when the global war on 
terrorism was launched by the President George W. Bush, the Algerian strategy against 
the radical groups was intensified and gave the Algerian security forces the legitimacy to 
act without constraint, considering themselves the vanguard against Jihad and sharing in 
the world effort to face the Terrorism threat. 
September 12, 2001, the Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika expressed his 
condolences to U.S. president George W. Bush and conveyed indirectly the main reasons 
for letting his government face the radical groups: 
I reaffirmed to President Bush the sympathy and the full solidarity of the 
Algerian people with the American people in these moments of gravest 
trial. Algeria understands perhaps better than others the pain of the 
families of the September 11 victims. For these reasons, Algeria supports 
the initiative of launching an international action against terrorism.69 
The U.S. military assistance to Algeria increased dramatically after 9/11 as a 
partner in the GWOT. Algeria has enjoyed 18 times the total amount of military 
assistance the country received over the previous 12 years.70 
By 2003, the GSPC leader (Hattab) appeared too weak to face the counter attack 
of the Algerian forces in the field. Guidere argued that besides the lack of support, Hattab 
faced the departure without his approval of many of his fighter to join Zarkaoui in Iraq. 71 
Algerians joining the Iraq insurgency was seen by Hattab as against the GSPC objective 
of prioritizing the fight against the Algerian regime, “the Near Enemy,” instead attacking 
“the Far Enemy.”72  
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After failing to convince his followers to join Iraq’s front, Hattab resigned, and 
then he surrendered to the Algerian security forces (or the oppressors as defined by the 
succeeding GSPC leader, Nabil Sahraoui).73 Thus, Nabil Sahrawi (a.k.a Abu Ibrahim 
Mustapha) took over the GSPC and was committed to being more productive than his 
predecessor. He issued his main vision related to the Jihad in Algeria:  
Here, we have evil America declaring a crusade and preparing the troops 
of the infidels to attack Islam everywhere. President Bush and many high 
officials clearly and loudly declared that this is a religious war under the 
banner of the cross. The goal of this war, which they called a ‘war on 
terrorism’ and ‘war against evil’ and other names, is to keep Islam and the 
Muslims from establishing the Country of Islam that would rule people 
with the book of Allah and His prophet.74 
In June 2004, Nabil Sahrawi was killed during clashes with the Algerian army, 
and Abdelmalik Dourkdal (a.k.a Abu Musab Abdelwadoud). In order to revive the 
recruiting efforts and the popular support lost after the dark period of the GIA, Dourkdal 
denied the Algerian government reports and those of some press agencies that announced 
the Jihadists movement had been undermined and wiped out by its internal divergences, 
conflicts between different main regional leaders, and the impact of the Algerian régime 
forces’ arrests and killings. The GSPC leader defended his opinion by expressing, “war is 
a contest, one day it goes for you, and another day against you…We kill them as they kill 
us.”75The GSPC leader started to revive the feeling that  U.S. President George W. Bush 
had declared after 9/11 “a sweeping war on Terrorism” and openly labeled this effort as a 
“crusade.”76. 
To build his strategy based on the Bush declaration, Dourkadl elaborated that his 
objective was not just to defend himself or his group, but that all the Muslims were under 
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threat not only by Bush, but also by their relative apostate regimes such as the Algerian, 
Egyptian, Pakistani and the Saudi regime, which, according to him, had sold out their 
own people’s interests.77 
The number of Algerians who joined the insurgent volunteers, or Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq, reached about 1,200 fighters, according to a Saudi Arabian intelligence.78 During 
this period, as previously mentioned, the GSPC attempted to overcome many difficulties 
dealing with the Algerian regime by asking for the external support. This situation was 
revealed when Mokhtar Bin Mokhtar (named El Para) was captured in Tchad with some 
other GSPC followers by the Tchady’s Army, supported by a French unit operating in the 
area. The GSPC asked the Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader, Zarkaoui, to kidnap some French 
diplomats in Iraq in order to force the French Government to liberate Mokhtar bin 
Mokhtar. This call did not receive any positive feedback, and Mokhtar was transferred to 
Algeria Forces.79 The second event that demonstrated the GSPC’s attempt to approach 
Al-Qaeda was when Zarkaoui captured two Algerian Diplomats in Iraq.  The GSPC 
asked to kill them because they were Algerian regime representatives, and they were 
supporting the invader (U.S.).80 It was noted that the GSPC rushed to congratulate Al-
Qaeda in Iraq for this “display of heroic jihad,”81 then celebrated the execution of the two 
Algerian diplomats for “the spilling of Muslims’ blood in Algeria.”82  
The GSPC leader said in a September 2005 interview: 
O’ young men of Islamic Maghreb… America is depositing its Marines in 
the grand desert and this is your chance to seek revenge for the events of 
Guantanamo, Abu Gharaib, Al-Aqsa [Jerusalem], and Al-Haramain [Saudi 
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Arabia]… This is your chance to erase the colonial borders… that were 
established surrounding our Islamic countries and turning them into 
prisons ruled by various oppressors …We (GSPC fighters) will be another 
brigade to join the brigades of holy jihad manifested by the holy attacks on 
New York and Washington under the leadership of Osama Ben Laden.83 
By this point, it had become a nearly unbroken routine for the GSPC to conclude 
their communiqués and propaganda videos by hailing as rightful leader of the global 
jihadist movement. 
The GSPC leader announced that it was time to shift its group name from GSPC 
to Al-Qaeda in the land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),84 which led this author to 
analyze the GSPC tactic before shifting its name to AQIM. During that period, the GSPC 
waged its campaign to enlist the youth as fighters and to get more supporters, mainly 
after the departure of many of its fighters to Iraq. They faced the reconciliation project 
proposed by the Algerian government to encourage the GSPC members to give up and 
surrender themselves to the security forces who realized that was productive. After that, it 
will be necessary to review the different steps taken by the GSPC prior to being aligned 
with Al-Qaeda.  
C. THE RISE OF THE AL-QAEDA ORGANIZATION IN THE ISLAMIC 
MAGHREB (AQIM) 
1. GSPC Status Prior to Aligning Itself with Al-Qaeda  
Between September 1998 and September 2001, the GSPC was rocked by internal 
rivalries, defections in its ranks and by numerous dissensions. Its combatants were 
maneuvering in the Algerian scrub, isolated and weakened by the initiatives in favor of 
the civil concord program in 1999 that let more than 1,200 GSPC members be forgiven.   
Several analysts pointed out that it was necessary to wait for the events of 
September 11, 2001, to see the new dynamics of a rebirth of the mind Jihadist and a 
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unification of Salafist under the same banner. The master of this dynamic was the 
previous GSPC leader Hassan Hattab. He unified the majority of different groups that 
appeared well organized and active.   
2. The Impact of September 11, 2001, on the GSPC 
It was reported that in September 2001, fifteen days after 9/11, the Algerian 
media related slaughters in the Al-Arbi city where twenty-three persons were killed, and 
nine others wounded.85 The GSPC were accused to have perpetrated this massacre. 
Nevertheless, in its communiqué of the October 1, 2001, the GSPC lingered to react or to 
deny being responsible for the massacres. The GSPC recalls in stride that it was always 
against the attacks of the civilians and the innocents, which was behind the GIA collapse. 
At the same time, the GSPC accused the Algerian security services of having perpetrated 
the slaughters while accusing the GSPC of committing them. The alleged purpose was to 
deprive the GSPC of its popular support. In his same communiqué, the GSPC chief 
pondered the timing of that massacre and other massacres that touched almost all the west 
of Algeria at the same period: “All Massacres only intervene some days after the attack 
of September 11 in America, as if our régime wanted to transmit a message that cursed 
Americans while telling to them: we are also the terrorism victims.”86 
  
The Algerian government used the national television to praise the victories of the 
Algerian army against terrorism; meanwhile, the GSPC continued attacking the Algerian 
Army and security forces.  It was the beginning of a new era of the jihad according to the 
expression of the GSPC leader Hassan Hattab, who reminded his followers: 
To mistrust the enemies of the inside and the outside who want us aliened 
with them, Christianized, Judases and to secularize under the pretexts of: 
globalization, global war on terrorism and the call for the peace.87  
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In January 2003, the GSPC leader strongly attacked the Algerian régime for its 
support of the Americans in their invasion of Iraq and considered that as treason to Iraq’s 
people.88   
3. The Impact of the War in Iraq on the GSPC 
Several analysts concluded prior to the war on Iraq, that the GSPC Hassan Hattab 
leader increased his violent attacks against the Algerian government and that this 
violence was an attack against the Algerian government foreign policies. This action 
countered a debate taking place inside the GSPC concerning the strategy that should be 
adopted with Al-Qaeda in case there was an effective occupation of Iraq by the coalition 
forces.  
It was pointed out that there were two main opinions within the GSPC group: 89  
The first side was the pan-Islamists who preferred the solidarity with the Iraqis in 
case of occupation. This side was led by the young chief within the GSPC, Abdelmalek 
Droukdal (alias Abou Moussab Abd Al-Wadoud).  
The second side was the Islamo-nationalistic that only swore by Algeria and put 
the interest of the Algerians well above all other consideration. Their goal was to 
overthrow the apostate Algerian regime, and  then build an Islamic state.   
This second camp was led by the GSPC Hassen Hattab (alias Hamza), who 
defended his strategy even after the invasion of the Iraq in March 2003. He opted only for 
a passive support, which was defined as exchanges of ideas and advice.90 The GSPC 
leader Hassen Hattab refused at that time to allow any of his followers to go fighting in 
Iraq. He considered that leaving Algeria to fight against the coalition in Iraq would lead 
to the end of the GSPC. It was pointed out also that the GSPC council requested in March 
2003, that Hattab publish a communiqué of indignation and threaten the American policy, 
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but he refused saying, “The GSPC should not interfere in state affairs of Iraq and the 
Iraqis do not need an external support.”91  
It was perceived that, despite the GSPC leader’s effort to convince his group 
members to keep focusing on the Algerian régime, the GSPC council voted, “Active 
support to the brothers Iraqis.”92 This position has even been taken by quite a lot of 
collaborators of GSPC. These collaborators estimated that the war in Algeria was 
potentially lost and that it was worth it to save honor by taking part in the jihad in Iraq.93   
However, Hattab Hassan emphasized that the charter of the GSPC was the official 
document to which the group’s chief had to refer, and clarified for his followers that their 
objectives were “to fight the Algerian renegade régime who was refusing the application 
of the Shari’a law…Algerian regime was doing worse than the American in Iraq.”94 
Yet, despite that major GSPC leader’s effort to stop his fighters from joining 
Iraq’s front, many of them left Algeria for Iraq as volunteers or were recruited by Al-
Qaeda without previous GSPC leader authorization.95 
 The free departure of the best GSPC fighters for Iraq was the drips that made 
overflow the vase.96 Consequently, the situation made it very difficult for the field 
commanders to carry out operations. Facing that critical situation, the GSPC leader did 
not have a choice other than to resign. Abou Ibrahim Mustapha (alias Nabil Sahraoui) 
took over as head of the GSPC in August 2003.97  
As Guidere pointed out, the new GSPC leader (Nabil sahraoui) appeared unable 
to get along with his own ambition, which was limited to overthrowing the Algerian 
regime or to applying his new political idea to actively support Iraq’s insurgents, which 
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had already been adopted by the GSPS council. Guidere added also that, the GSPC 
leader’s incapacity to execute his plan to support Iraqi’s insurgents was due to the two 
following reasons:   
First, he did not possess a proper, safe, and sure network that would allow him to 
organize the departure of the Algerian combatants to Iraq.   
Second, he was convinced that the important objective was to fight the Algerian 
regime. He could not make such declarations countering the GSPC council decision to 
actively support Iraqi’s insurgents because he avoided the GSPC split, then a definitive 
disappearance of Jihad. 
In September 2003, the second anniversary of 9/11, the GSPC leader attempted 
approach with the Al-Qaeda message by publishing a communiqué in support of the 9/11 
event. In its communiqué, the GSPC leader presented its apologies  for failing to support 
Al-Qaeda then and expressed his admiration for Mullah Omar and for Ben Laden, “The 
Sheik Osama  that god the protecting him - is account among the sincere Mujahidin of 
our time…he distinguishes himself by his support to the Islam and to the Muslims 
everywhere or they are.”98 
Camille al-Tawil mentioned that in spite of the participation of several Algerian 
fighters in Iraq’s insurgency, this later activity did not appear in the GSPC literature, 
probably due to the GSPC concentration on its operations inside Algeria. The first 
communiqué of the Algerian group commenting on what was happening in Iraq appeared 
February 7, 2004. In this communiqué, the GSPC leader reminded its fighters that, “It is 
needed to attack all those who supporting the war in Iraq, mainly the foreign enterprises 
of the unbelievers such as the Americans, the French, the British ...”99  
 
The GSPC leader commented in his communiqué that Iraq’s front was a model to 
follow and the Iraqi fields qualified as Earth of jihad and martyrdom, “Happy the one  
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who will die in martyr! Happy who will die while accomplishing the duty individual of 
the jihad…par Allah, all our deaths are to the paradise and the deaths of the infidels are in 
hell?”100   
It was clear in this later GSPC message that it was providing an incentive for any 
who joined the front to fight the Algerian security forces, and it could be seen also as a 
direct call for recruiting supporters, mainly among the youth. 
4.  The Failed Recruitment Campaign  
The GSPC launched a campaign of propaganda to recruit among the university 
youth in 2005. The main GSPC campaign goal was to reinforce its ranks and replace its 
combatants. Many GSPC fighters had already gone to Iraq; others were killed by the 
Algerian security forces or gave up by surrendering themselves to the Algerian regime 
forces. During this campaign, several tracts had also been circulated in several Algerian 
universities praising the youth as “the backbone of the nation”101 and the key for victory.  
The GSPC pursued its vibrant call to the youth who had the strength and the 
conscience to join the ranks of the Mujahedeen and to fight against the tyrants and the 
unbelieving régimes.102  
Indeed, in order to mobilize the Algerian youth masses during the year 2005, it 
was reported that the GSPC leader put the accent on several themes that had a certain 
impact on the targets.  The first strongly emphasized theme was the family and the 
family’s code. The GSPC leader qualified them as copies of the French codes, 
“…estimating that it will soon be a copy of the French code exactly as it is already in the 
school programs.”103  
The second theme used was the one of work and the academic diplomas. The 
chief of the GSPC rejected their utility in the professional life and called the youth to 
look for the diploma of Allah (Allah chahada’a) rather than the diploma of the Al 
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University (Achahadaa’Al-Jaamiya), “it will not serve to anything, while the other 
diploma (the one of Allah) will open the doors of the paradise.”104   
The third theme exploited by the GSPC leader was the nature of the Algerian 
society, “It concerned the misery of youth Algerian, under the responsibility of a 
corrupted Algerian government.”105 
By all these propaganda messages, it was clear that social issues served the GSPC 
as a favorable topic for spreading its ideologies among the youth to recruit as many as it 
could.   
In the last phase of the propaganda, the GSPC, on September 11, 2005, proposed 
a “diploma in the Jihad for whoever joined its ranks before the beginning of the academic 
year...”106    
Due to the rudimentary character of this propaganda and the effect of the GIA 
massacres on the Algerians, the GSPC influence had a limited impact on the youth, which 
resulted in it failing to recruit among youth. That situation then forced the GSPC to start 
its struggle against the Algerian regime reconciliation project, which gave any GSPC 
fighters the opportunity to give up and surrender themselves to the Algerian security 
forces. 
5.  The GSPC Facing the Algerian Regime Charter for Peace and 
National Reconciliation Project 
That campaign took place some weeks before the holding of the referendum on 
the charter for the peace and the reconciliation promoted by the Algerian president 
(Abdelaziz Bouteflika). He had indicated his intent to provide for a general amnesty in 
connection with the reconciliation, and he asked all the Algerians for their approval 
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through a referendum.107 For that reason, the GSPC led a big communicational offensive 
to convince the Algerians not to take part in the vote. It was reported that the GSPC was 
issuing a daily communiqué during the last week of September 2005. It was reported also 
that the GSPC was using all arguments to deter the voters.108  
The GSPC appeared disconnected from the Algerian population, but it continued 
distributing its messages as referring to the fourteen years of interaction with the régime 
since the cancelling of the 1990s elections, “Oh, Muslims! Fourteen years on Allah’s 
path? Were worth … continuing in the same path to the eternal paradise.”109   
A gap existed between the popular aspirations and the GSPC policies, which were 
considered a Utopian project by proposing an impractical social agenda. On September 
27, 2005, the GSPC leader published a long letter addressed to the Algerian people titled, 
“No peace without the Islam.”110 The GSPC leader reiterated his firm opposition to the 
charter for peace and reconciliation and argued that, “There were only the people of the 
truth (Al-Haqq) and the people of perdition (Ahl Al-Zalat)…The Mujahedeen of the 
GSPC are of course in correct path while all others are in the wrong way…”111  But as 
Jebnoun was mentioned by Jebnoun, that beyond its argument typically Salafist and 
radically oriented, the chief of the GSPC presented a certain number of more concrete 
elements that justified, according to him, the further GSPC  struggle  in Algeria:  
This Algerian regime allowed the installation of the U.S. military bases in 
the South of Algeria, It (Algerian regime) sold the oil wells and gas fields 
to multi-nationals... It worked with the former colonizers armies… it 
changed the code nationality…it canceled the chain of Islamic studies... 
But in all this, he did not consult the people even for once…112  
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For the GSPC leader, the list of grievances was long because  the referendum on 
peace and reconciliation served only the interests of its promoters and sought to 
whitewash the army of all his actions during the civil war, whether kidnapping, torture, or 
miserable  camps in the desert ... etc.113 The GSPC leader’s objective was to remind and 
convince the Algerian society to reject the Regime reconciliation project by displaying a 
comparison between the French army  prior to the independence and the Algerian army 
grievances, “The French army had taken 6,000 people during the war of independence 
while the Algerian security services had vanished more than 20,000 people in the early 
years of Jihad and these people are still missing.114   
The GSPC leader believed that there were sufficient reasons for the continuation 
of Jihad struggle in Algeria. But he added, in another communiqué, that in order to 
mobilize the mainstream of the Algerian society which claimed that unemployment 
undermined the regime:   
…Where are the oil revenues? Why every time the oil price increases on 
the external market, the deviant life dearer in the domestic market? Why 
the unemployment is rises there at the same time? All these 
inconsistencies do not make it directly responsible the Algerian 
government.115 
Politically, the GSPC leader considered that the Concorde project proposed by the 
Algerian regime in 1999 had no relationship to the draft of National Reconciliation in 
2005 because the events of September 11, 2001, changed ideas locally and globally. The 
GSPC leader argued that the same events are not seen or treated in the same way prior or 
post 9/11, “Those who were merely Islamists before 9-11 became terrorists after.”116 
It was perceived by regional analysts that the GSPC leader tried to emphasize that 
the project of reconciliation was as one of aspects of the war against terrorism led by the 
U.S. administration and by Algeria itself. 
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6.  The GSPC Focused on the External Circumstances to Undermine the 
Algerian Regime and Survive 
The reconciliation process partially failed. The main reason was that the first 
measures of amnesty applied to the repentant GSPC combatants.  It did not serve the 
process of pacification already engaged by the Algerian government.  It was reported that 
by the beginning of 2006 a discontent took place in several Muslims countries due to the 
Prophet Mohammed caricatures being published in some Western countries, such as 
those by Charlie Hebdomadaire 117 in France, which negatively affected the public 
opinion in several countries and in Algeria for several weeks.   
Consequently, on March 9, 2006, the GSPC published its communiqué to call the 
previous GSPC fighters just released from jail at that time to join the group (GSPC) in the 
mountains to defend the Prophet Mohammed’s memory and to counter the Algerian 
Regime reconciliation program.118 By the same communiqué, the GSPC leader explained 
that first, the Algerian regime released some of the previous GSPC militants who were 
captured and imprisoned, and it was under the foreign NGO’s pressure. 
Second, the GSPC leader added that, it was useless to look for anyway to get out 
from jail by taking advantage of the Algerian regime reconciliation charter.   
Finally, the GSPC leader reminded the repentant not to follow the regime tactics 
and that they had to respect their obligation to the GSPC group, “The GSPC calls all free 
brothers to forget the allegiance lent before their confinement and has join the ranks of 
their brothers Mujahidin to make to triumph the religion and to uproot the heresy of this 
country.”119 
It was mentioned that several repentant took advantage of the offered 
reconciliation measures and did not acknowledged the GSPC calls to join it again. It was 
noted that about only hundred out of more than 2000 freed prisoners who had been GSPC 
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militants rejoined the GSPC.120It was clear that the GSPC did not achieve its goal to 
undermine the Algerian regime reconciliation measures.  On the other hand, the Algerian 
government was considered successful convincing the mainstream of the released 
prisoners to not join the GSPC. Many analysts pointed out that, despite the incapacity of 
the GSPC to convince its previous militants to rejoin the field against the Algerian 
regime, the GSPC leader did not display the reality of weakness at that time. The GSPC 
leader pursued his categorical refusal of the reconciliation and reaffirmed that his group 
would continue its war against the regime without mercy for victory or martyrdom. In 
addition, the GSPC was looking for an alternative solution to survive and face the 
regime’s permanent pressure, “We announce to the tyrants that the GSPC Mujahidin 
prepared a parallel project to theirs, that will disrupt their plan soon and will prevent their 
sleep, so God wants it.”121   
It was understood the first time that the GSPC was preparing an alternative plan to 
overcome its failure by recruiting among the youth and gain the mainstream of its 
previous militants released under the reconciliation program. As was pointed out by some 
experts, the message revealed that the GSPC was preparing a plan to survive, but it was 
not so clear that it would be aligned with Al-Qaeda as an appropriate solution. This 
hypothesis will lead the author to lay out more details describing the GSPC alliance with 
Al-Qaeda.   
7. The GSPC Toward Expansion 
According to several regional experts, the expansion of the GSPC or its approach 
to Al-Qaeda took place after the accomplishment of the following three main objectives. 
First, it came closer to the Arabian combatants in Chechnya and acted as a broker in the 
Al-Qaeda networks. 
Next, it took advantage of the services of Al-Qaeda Iraqi’s branch, its field 
expertise and enhanced its militants’ Jihad’s ideology. 
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Finally, the third GSPC objective realized was to federate all the Maghreb Salafist 
groups around a regional project and to display its expertise in the media domain. 
8.  The GSPC Approaching Chechnya  
According to reports, two months after taking the lead of the GSPC, 
Abdelwadoud sent a message of congratulations to the Chechen mujahidin for the murder 
of the renegade collaborator Ahmed Kadirov, considered as the Chechen president and 
pro-Russian by the previous Russian president, Vladimir Putin, in the separatist province 
of the North, Caucasia. It was an opportunity for the chief of the GSPC to send his 
message to praise the Chechen and several Arabic militants among them, such as Abou 
Hafs. It was also an occasion to blame some Muslim leaders, accusing them of selling 
their religion and their people to the unbelievers. He mentioned at the same time that 
some other leaders should be targeted, such as Karzai in Afghanistan and Malki in 
Iraq...”122 
As pointed out by Camille al-Tawil, the relations between the two mentioned 
leaders, Abdel Wadoud and Abou Hafs, quickly became tight, but only for a short period. 
This friendship was soon replaced by the Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq (Abu Musab Al-
Zarqawi).123 This relationship seemed a more strategic alliance that could facilitate 
GSPC leadership contact with the Al-Qaeda leader. 
Since that decision, the GSPC leader concentrated all his efforts on the Iraqi front 
and was content with minimum relations with the Chechen Mujahidin. This was apparent 
when the GSPC leader addressed his condolences communiqués. First, he expressed 
sympathy for the death of the legal adviser of the Chechen combatants, Sheik Abou Omar 
Al-Sayaf, and Chechen leader, Bassaev chef, Shamil.124 They were killed, respectively,  
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during confrontations with the Russian strengths in December 13, 2005, and by an 
explosion on July 10, 2006. Second, he expressed sympathy for the death of Zarkaoui, 
killed by air strike in Iraq on June 7, 2006.125 
Several experts figured out that there were clear differences comparing the 
content of the two condolence communiqués. It was reported that Zarqaoui had been 
described as a lion of Islam, which is a qualification generally reserved for Ben Laden.  
Bassev was described only as a lion of the Chechens.126  The GSPC leader took 
advantage each time to emphasize that the GSPC, Chechen and Al-Qaeda groups had the 
same ideological objective by sharing the same ideology and waging the same war 
against the Islam enemies: Algerian regime, the Russians cursed in Chechnya and by the 
Americans in Iraq.    
9. The GSPC Attempt to Attract the North African Groups   
The GSPC leader communiqués related to local attacks and the declarations 
concerning the national politics focused on international politics. Also, they appeared to 
have concern for the different events agitating the Maghreb or the Middle East at that 
time. This shift, from a national preoccupation away from a main concern for the regional 
governments, is important.   
One of the first meaningful demonstrations of this political shift was at the 
summit of the Arabian league that was held in Algiers on March 22–24, 2005. That 
summit had to make positive, institutional reforms. It was limited to declarations of 
intentions without making any real commitment. The leaders were satisfied to repeat the 
offer of Beirut in 2002, namely peace with Israel in exchange for the withdrawal of 
territories occupied since 1967.  
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Two days prior to the summit, the daily Algerian Newspaper “Alkhbar,” dated 
March 20, 2005, published an open letter sent by the GSPC chief to the Arab leaders in 
Algiers. In his letter, the GSPC leader called the summit “The summit of Arab 
humiliation.” 127 
In this letter, he deplored the lack of discernment of Arab elites who had thrown 
themselves into the arms of communism, or into the arms of capitalism.128  He said also 
that the cause of failure of the Arabic societies was due to their leaders. He accused them 
of betrayal, “…They are the seeds sown by the collaborative coalition Judeo-crossed in 
the body of the Muslim nation.” 129This declaration of GSPC leader was, in reality, a 
literal return to a topic largely developed by Ben Laden a few months earlier, during the 
American elections.  
In fact, it was in late 2004 when Ben Laden was interviewed and said that his goal 
was not fighting against the freedom, but to fight as the defender of Muslims against the 
foreigner interference or hegemony.130  
By taking up the themes, the GSPC leader tried to fit directly into the global ihad 
preached by Al-Qaeda, which regarded Muslim leaders as agents of the West and the 
Arab League as a puppet in the American hands.131 In the same letter, the GSPC leader 
presented the Jihad as the unique solution for the different issues facing the North 
African region societies, 
The only real alternative for a Muslim nation to regain its sovereignty and 
its honor is to have emirs who fight jihad around the world ... our choice 
today is jihad and nothing else.132 
                                                 
127 Al-Tawil, Al-Qaeda Wa Akhwatouha’.  
128 “The Summit of Arab Humiliation.” in Arabic by the Daily Algerian Newspaper Al-Akhbar, March 
20, 2005.  
129 “The Summit of Arab Humiliation.” translated by thesis author, Khalifa Hajji in the daily Algerian 
Newspaper Al-Akhbar, on March 20, 2005.  
130 Guidere, Al-Qaeda a la Conquête Du Maghreb.       
131  Ibid.        
132 Al-Tawil, Al-Qaeda Wa Akhwatouha’.  
 42
The GSPC leader reminded the Arabic leaders that what had happened to Saddam 
was to be taken as a lesson learned.  It mentioned the efforts by the GSPC to get more 
support and mobilize the societies to undermine their respective regime is what led the 
GSPC to focus on the media finding it as successful a propaganda tool as when it was 
used by Al-Qaeda.  
10.  The GSPC Attempt to Improve and Expand Its Media Expertise  
With the events of September 11, 2001, the GSPC formed a new form of 
spectacular terrorism based on the use of the media and reporters.  The GSPC admirers 
have followed this path and developed the concept in varying forms, sometimes as 
atrocious as was Zarkaoui in Iraq. 
In the summer 2005, the GSPC waged a big communication campaign within and 
outside of Algeria.  Its objective was to improve its image, tarnished by years of an army 
presence that was resented by the Algerians. It also hoped to counter the aggressive 
campaign waged by the Algerian regime to support the charter for peace and 
reconciliation, which forced the GSPC to lose a number of its combatants. 
Camille al-Tawil reported that there were two big communication campaigns, one 
just after Operation Badr of Mauritania133 and the other just after the execution of two 
Algerian diplomats in Iraq.134                  
a.  Operation Badr at the Algerian Mauritanian Borders 
Although many experts and local analysts saw that the goal of operation 
Badr was collecting more weapons, the same experts realized that the factors of success 
of this mission were the isolated position of the attacked post. Additionally, the 
collaboration of some local Mauritanians smugglers played a role.  
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For its part, the GSPC declared that the main reasons for the Badr 
operation were to revenge their brother Mujahidin arrested by the Mauritanian regime, hit 
the  Flintlock135 plan established by America and its agents in the region to combat the 
GSPC, and to ignite the flame of Jihad.136    
The GSPC leader invited young North Africans to, “come learn the art of 
combat and prepare to light the fire under the feet of infidels and apostates.”137 
This appeal was largely diffused and was relegated to the jihad forums, 
accompanied by a long video of a battle of Badr operations in the desert of Mauritania 
and Algeria. The GSPC objective was to publish this operation on its Web site as another 
seductive way to recruit supporters among the regional youth.  
A week after the execution of the operation, a statement to Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq, signed by the head of the media division of the organization (so-called Abu Maysara 
Al-Iraq), congratulated the GSPC for its operation against the enemies of Allah in 
Mauritania. 138  The Al-Qaeda response was considered very important because it was the 
first time that Al-Qaeda expressed its admiration of another group not among its 
affiliation. Therefore, the GSPC leader expressed that the two groups (GSPC and Al-
Qaeda in Iraq) started to be united.139 This link was later displayed by the kidnapping and 
the execution of two Algerian diplomats by Zarqawi in Iraq. 
b.  The Algerian Hostages Case     
It was only one month after operation Badr in Mauritania that two 
Algerian diplomats (Ali Bellaroussi and Ezzeddine Bekhadhi) were abducted by Al-
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Qaeda in Iraq fighters.140They were threatening to execute them if the Algerian 
government did not cease all cooperation with coalition forces in Iraq and with the Iraqi 
interim government at that time. 
In his first statement dated July 23, 2005, the GSPC expressed his immense 
satisfaction for the work of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. A week later, on July 28, 2005, specifically, 
the GSPC leader officially expressed its great satisfaction for the murder of the two 
Algerian diplomats and re-expressed his admiration for Al-Qaeda in Iraq.  
It was reported at that time by the Algerian newspapers and mainly by Al-Akhbar, 
that the GSPC leader affirmed the preeminence of the religious fraternity over ethnic 
nationality. 
However, this later GSPC declaration caused a national and international debate. 
After that, the GSPC became more isolated.  Its attitude towards the two chief diplomats 
caused the GSPC to be increasingly condemned not only by the Algerian people but also 
by the Communities International, which let it lose rather than gain support.141  
The GSPC believed that the Algerian newspapers used false information provided 
by the Algerian security forces. Consequently, the GSPC proceeded  by scanning and 
publishing on its Web site in January 2006, the set of its communiqués and all its main 
publications except the  communiqués related  to  the period of the ex GSPC leader 
Hassen Hattab, who probably carried them away with him  after his resignation in 
2003.142  
The expertise gained by the GSPC in putting up a Web site was a revolution for 
the GSPC. It was reported that the GSPC started to control and monitor all the 
communication process from the production of materials (news, magazine, sound 
recording, film or video board). 
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It was also realized that despite the incessant efforts provided by the Algerian 
security services computer expert to jam or to confuse the GSPC message, it became 
virtually impossible to stop the GSPC message by any actions against propaganda or 
disinformation campaigns. 
According to an unofficial discussion between an Algerian senior officer who is a 
computer engineer and this author that during these later visits to Algiers in 2005 and in 
2007, it was impossible to counter the GSPC jihadist propaganda efficiently. However, 
the option for the Algerian security forces was to deactivate the use of the group’s Web 
site (GSPC) which in turn reacted by regularly changing the Web address and belie any 
false information broadcast by the Algerian security services. 
Indeed, the video was the major innovation of the GSPC in the year 2006. It was 
imitating the propaganda methods of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The GSPC required all members 
to film their attacks, day and night. Those media actions have galvanized the fighting and 
GSPC became more isolated, in the large desert and the huge mountains of Alger, losing 
the society supports mainly after expressing its satisfaction for the two diplomat murders 
in Iraq. 
It was argued by several experts that, although the videos showed that the GSPC 
was a victorious group, those who were lost in battle were recognized as martyrs. This 
doctrine of martyrdom was already preached by Al-Qaeda in Iraq at that time. It stressed 
the importance of propaganda through the means of proper communication.143 
By September 2006, the nature of the connection between the GSPC and the 
central command of Al-Qaeda under Ben Laden and Zawahiri leadership was not so 
clear. 
According to Guidere, the period of observation lasted a whole year, from 
September 2005 to September 2006. During that period, the analysts consider that many 
internal reforms had been undertaken to meet the exigencies of Al-Qaeda. The most 
important was the way the GSPC displayed its communication expertise facing the 
Algerian regime, saying it was presenting false information. In addition, the GSPC 
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developed their propaganda expertise as used by Al-Qaeda. Once the GSPC met the Al-
Qaeda requirements in communications methods and propaganda expertise, Al-Qaeda 
embraced its affiliation.  
11.  The Allegiance to Al-Qaeda 
In a September 2006 video message commemorating 9/11, Al-Qaeda deputy Al-
Zawahiri said: “We pray to God that the GSPC will be a thorn in the throats of the 
American and French Crusaders and their allies (…) this should be a source of chagrin, 
frustration and sadness for the traitors and apostate sons of France.”144 
On September 14, 2006, just two days after the video of Zawahiri was broadcast 
announcing the allegiance of the GSPC to Al-Qaeda, the Algerian group (GSPC) 
published a communiqué confirming its allegiance to the Al-Qaeda leader (Sheik 
Osama):  
We are glad to inform our Islamic nation and our Muslim brothers around 
the world about the great news which the Mujahedeen have been waiting 
for… the news of the merging of the Salafist Group for Prayer and 
Combat in Algeria with Al-Qaeda, … We have decided to swear Bayat to 
Sheikh Osama Ben Laden and to continue our jihad in Algeria as soldiers 
under his command, for him to use us in the cause of Allah when and 
where he sees fit….145 
Finally, on January 24, 2007, the Algerian group announced that its name had 
shifted from GSPC to the organization of Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or as 
reported in some other publications (Tanzim Al-Qaeda Bi-Bilad Al-Magrib Al-Islami) Al-
Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb. This declaration led the author to analyze the 
impact of this name change on the different attacks carried out within Algeria. Were there 
any links between the AQIM and the different operations carried out in the other 
Maghreb countries by their radical groups? Is the AQIM really taking the leadership of 
all the radical groups in the Maghreb? Which kind of links could exist between the 
AQIM and the other radical groups mainly in Tunisia, Morocco and Libya?  
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The author will focus on the 2007 attacks carried out in Algeria and in the other 
countries to present an objective analysis to the readers about the aim of the different 
groups. 
 48
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IV. THE MAIN AQIM OPERATIONS IN ALGERIA 
The author analysis will focus on the operations carried out by AQIM within 
Algeria or abroad during 2007. In addition to the AQIM operations the analysis will 
cover the different operations conducted by other north African radical groups  in their 
respective countries (Tunisia, Morocco and in Libya), except the Mauritanian Group  
operations which will be subject to further studies.  
A.  THE OPERATION OF BOUCHAOUI  
The operation of Bouchaoui was the first concrete manifestation of the allegiance 
of the GSPC with Al-Qaeda, after attacking mainly Western foreign interests. On 
December 10, 2006, the GSPC, newly admitted to Al-Qaeda, led an attack in Bouchaoui 
(region in West Algiers) against a bus carrying employees of a U.S. Oil company. The 
attack killed one person and wounded nine others, most of them Western (British, 
Americans, and Canadians).  
The first attack against the group of foreigners was claimed by a statement posted 
on jihadist forums January 23, 2007, which was one day before the change of name of 
group. The statement was accompanied by a complete film of the operation starting by 
tracking the sites, bomb making, monitoring, live explosive practice, and demonstrations 
of the character of its professional combatants. The GSPC/AQIM video was preceded by 
an introduction featuring Ben Laden and his deputy Zawahri. The investigation at that 
time demonstrated that the Bouchaoui perpetrators were supported by some of their local 
area informants.146 This operation has been highly publicized for several reasons. First of 
all, because the AQIM attacked one of the powerful American oil companies,  
Halliburton, and secondly, because that operation had been filmed in full by the 
GSPC/AQIM. The video recording has been widely circulated and commented on in 
forums and the media worldwide.  
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Finally, the GSPC/AQIM utilized the topographical visualization software Google 
Earth, developed by a U.S. company, to prepare this operation against an American 
target.  
B.  THE ABU AL-BARRA OPERATION 
On Tuesday, February 13, 2007, at 4:30 a.m., the Mustafa Boumerdes region 
residents 50 km east of the capital Algiers awoke to the sound of explosions. Many feared 
it was an earthquake in a region known for its seismic activity. However, after a while, 
the Boumerdes population realized that the AQIM had exploded six cars simultaneously 
close to the police center by remote control.147 
This attack followed by several other attacks in a different Algerian regions killed 
more than a hundred dead and wounded of police and security forces, besides the 
destruction of some public buildings.   
Two weeks after the attacks of February 13, 2007, the AQIM released a statement 
entitled, “the comedy bombs defused.”  This release countered the reports that appeared 
in the Algerian press and picked up by the International press about several bombs that 
had been defused by security forces.  
The statement added that the Algerian people may be fooled by the 
disinformation, but the group has learned lessons from the past and those civilians were 
never and would not ever be its goal, “It is not surprising that the tyrants who perpetrated 
the crimes against Muslims and blame them on the mujahedeen. They did that in the past 
and could do it in the future ... In this case we promise to revenge our brothers and punish 
the tyrants for their crimes.”148 
In another statement preceding the next attack planned for April 11, 2007, the 
AQIM has called on Algerians to reassure them: “Do not worry! Your mujahedeen 
brothers know very well how to choose their targets.”149 
                                                 




C.  THE APRIL 11, 2007, ATTACKS  
The April attacks were qualified by the organization itself as “operation unique.” 
The statement said they had been thoroughly planned and prepared, carefully selected 
targets.  
The first target was the Government Palace in Algiers and the bomber who led the 
operation was a man called by his war name “Muadh Ibnou Jabal.”150  The vehicle, 
which was aimed at the government palace, contained, according to the statement of 
AQIM, 700kg of explosives. The organization claimed more than 45 dead and an 
unknown number of wounded in addition to badly damaging the building.  
The second AQIM target was the Interpol headquarters in Algiers (Bab Ezzouwar). The 
author of the attack was “Abu Zubayr Sajida“ (war name) who was heading toward the 
building with a vehicle also loaded with 700kg of explosives. The seat of “anti-Jihad” in 
the words of the AQIM was completely destroyed, killing eight persons among the 
occupants (official figure).151  
The third target was also in Bab Ezzouwar (Algiers). It was the headquarters of 
Special Forces police. The attack was perpetrated by the so called “Abou  Doujana” 
(name of Martyr,) who was bearing down on the building with a car packed with 500kg 
of explosives. The number of dead and wounded was unknown, the statement said, but 
the AQIM claimed more than 200 dead and wounded, besides the two buildings being 
completely destroyed and the palace of government partially damaged. Nearly two tons 
of explosives were used in these nearly simultaneous operations as reported by the 
investigators after the attacks.152 
The first explosion, the palace of government, had been operated by the bomber 
himself as suicide bomber, but the other two, those of Bab Ezzouwar were by remote 
control. AQIM has changed the GSPC tactics of a direct confrontation by using a remote 
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control car bomb. The technique that has been used by the AQIM warriors was 
considered easier and less costly in human lives, and it indicated the degree of its 
professional ranks.  
The April 11 attacks have shown the high degree of professionalism of the 
combatants by AQIM: simultaneous explosions triggered at a distance, car bombs, 
suicide bombers candidates, propaganda machine very efficient, and selective 
recruitment. The AQIM had chosen its new strategy based on its experience going from 
the periphery to the center, from the mountains to the cities. This new strategy has 
enabled it to compensate for his lack of fighters and let it take advantage of the media to 
confirm its presence and ability to attack the Algerian regime.  
In an audio recording published by the Al-Ribat153 just two days after the attacks 
of April 13, 2007, the preacher described as “Abu al-Harith” explained the different 
reasons that led the AQIM to carry out the Algiers attacks: 
The first reason was the Traitor Algerian regime and its collaboration with the 
Americans who ran the national oil wealth.  
The second reason in the record was military cooperation with the Americans. He 
cited that several military camps were built in the desert in addition to the Rouiba Air 
Base, which conceded to the U.S. Air Force. For AQIM, this was considered the 
beginning of foreign occupation, and its presence must be fought by all means.  
Finally, the third reason given was the adoption of the Algerian regime of “anti-
Islamic” modeled on the Americans in their fight against terrorism.154 
The Algerian President Abdellaziz Boutaflika declaration, “We do not want an 
Islamic state or a secular state, and we want a democratic state,”155has been strongly 
criticized in the AQIM leader’s speech.  It was a chance for AQIM to mock the 
democracy as practiced in Algeria. For all these reasons, the preacher called on the 
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combatants of the AQIM organization to hit the regime, and he has supported the 
Algerian struggle of the mujahedeen in every way. The same person also recalled some 
points that had been in an earlier release such as warning security forces not to fight by 
any means, otherwise they would be severely punished: “No repentance will not be 
disturbed in his life. We ask him not to join us, but simply not to fight us either by arms, 
by money or by discourses…”156 
By analyzing its different attacks in 2007, it is evident that AQIM focused on 
government and security targets while trying to avoid the loss of human life among 
civilians and in its own ranks. These attacks were conducted in early morning or 
overnight, using car bombs and remote-controlled devices, though there were some 
suicide bombing. Most of these attacks have been publicized through the Internet in order 
to legitimize the group’s actions and for it to appear as being powerful. 
So, despite its efforts, AQIM still has not succeeded in mobilizing Algerian 
society and gaining international support to get rid of the Algerian regime. 
The struggle waged by AQIM against the Algerian regime failed. The AQIM was 
unable to counter the reconciliation program proposed by the Algerian regime. The 
AQIM also failed to recruit the needed number of fighters to its front.  The media battle 
was won by the Algerian regime. Guidere pointed out that since its media campaign, the 
AQIM was waging a battle to survive.  
It was reported also that the Algerian regime disable the AQIM Web site.157 
Moreover, despite the numerous operations conducted against Algerian security forces 
and foreign interests, the AQIM was weakened and its actions were totally isolated. The 
Algerian minister of interior said, “The GSPC, an ally of Al-Qaeda or not is a movement 
which tends to be eradicated completely and does not pose a problem and poses no 
threat.”158In addition to the Algerian representative government statement after the 
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attacks of April 11, 2007, and as presented at that time by the Al-Jazira News, the FIS 
(Front Islamique Salut) leaders Abbassi Madani and Rabih Kabir have both condemned 
the attacks from their exile respectively Qatar and Suisse but they accused the Algerian 
regime to be behind these attacks directly or indirectly.159  
Consequently, it appears obvious that the evolution of the Algerian group to shift 
its name from GSPC to AQIM had been made without consulting the other actors in the 
Algerian Islamist movement or even other small groups that are not affiliated to GSPC, 
who worked in Algerians mountains. It was a personal decision of the GSPC leader who 
spent two years struggling to join the organization of, making a special, solitary Algerian 
Jihad. It had been designed so that the name change and the aggressive attacks were 
against the Algerian society and the interests of the country. The AQIM marginalized 
other religious parties such as former FIS and prevented them from being involved in the 
political System. 
This situation led the author to check to determine if there is any link between 
AQIM and the other radical groups in Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. The link between the 
AQIM cited and the radical groups in North Africa will be checked via an analysis of the 
different operations carried out in 2007 by the cited groups separately or combined. 
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V. THE AQIM AND THE NORTH AFRICAN RADICAL GROUPS 
PROBABLE LINKS STUDIES 
A.  THE TUNISIAN RADICAL ACTIVIST GROUP 
The first religious party raised in the 1980s was Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, or the 
Islamic Liberation Party (ILP)—which was founded in Jerusalem in 1948 in order to 
liberate Palestine and was aimed at the establishment of an Islamic state and the 
restoration of the Caliphate in the entire Muslim world. The ILP formed a branch in 
Tunisia and started its clandestine activities. The government became aware of its 
activities and prosecuted 29 members.160  
Despite the non-existence of Al-Qaeda during that period, Tunisia experienced a 
Moslem ideals advancement of importance. The main actor of this was the Al-Nahdha 
movement, a fundamentalist Moslem renaissance movement created in 1981. The group 
seized the opportunity for advancement because of the liberalization of the political 
system by the previous Tunisian president, Habib Bourguiba.  This movement took the 
Islamic tendency movement as a name (MTI), before becoming Al-Nahdha in 1989.161 
Rashed Al-Ghannoushi, the MTI leader influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Syria and by Salafism when he was at university in Damascus, was convinced that social 
reform based on the true principles of Islam was the only option for his country. Al-
Ghannoushi made the following observation when he returned to Tunisia, “I remember 
we used to feel like strangers in our own country. After having been educated as Muslims 
and Arabs, we found our own country totally molded in the French cultural identity.”162 
During this stage, the government generally tolerated Islamic movements, which 
were not considered a threat. Leftist elements were then regarded as the primary threat, 
with Islamist movements counterbalancing the left, particularly in mosques, schools and 
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universities. In its early days, the MTI focused on moral issues and was considered as a 
“religious association with reformist tendencies.”163 With the government presenting 
itself as favoring Islamic principles, to face the leftists’ activities after the failure of 
Ahmed Ben Salah (the former minister of planning 1961–1969) in adopting the 
cooperative system, the MTI was free to broaden its support base. 
Anneli Botha quoted that Shahin pointed out that the MTI was well structured and 
included three main cells, Usar Maftuha, Usar Multazim, and Al-Maktab Al-Siyas. The 
main function of these different cells had different tasks. 
In 1979, the Tunisian activist group (MTI), as well as several religious 
organizations in the Muslim world inspired by the Iranian revolution, started to be more 
active. At first, the Tunisian government began to question the motives of the Islamist 
movements, and this often led to open confrontation. Becoming defensive and trying to 
undermine the MTI efforts under the pretext to revive the lost Islamic principles within 
the Tunisian society, the Tunisian government tried to project the state as the guardian of 
Islam as stated by the Former Tunisian Interior Minister Driss Guiga in 1981.164  
Later and according its conference held in May 1981, the MTI decided to keep its 
clandestine base; it also worked to achieve broader recognition by forming alliances with 
other political role-players.165 The MTI asked for recognition as a political party by 
opting for a political non-violent approach. But the government reacted in July 1981 by 
arresting 60 members, including the MTI leadership, charging them with forming an 
illegal organization, defaming the president and publishing false news reports.166  
In order to eliminate any kind of pretext used by the MTI to mobilize the society 
and in an attempted reconciliation with moderate Islamists, President Ben Ali introduced 
measures including  the reinstatement and reaffirmation of Islam as the country’s 
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religion, the adoption of a more conciliatory attitude towards what for the first time was 
considered moderate Islamism and strict legal measures against all types of subversive 
activity in the name of Islam. In addition, Tunisia has achieved poverty alleviation and 
state-society synergy through the country’s impressive National Solidarity Fund (NSF) or 
as known in French acronym Fonds de Solidarité Nationale (FNS), also known as 
“Caisse 26-26” (26- 26 Fund).167  
The MTI expressed its willingness to adhere to the new party law of 1988, which 
prohibited the formation of political parties on the basis of religion, region or language 
and changed its name to Harakat an-Nahda or the Renaissance Movement.168 In essence, 
it was perceived that An-Nahda hoped to introduce Shari’a law through participating plan 
in the electoral process, as adapted by some other organizations, such as the FIS, had 
done in Algeria. 
In the elections of April 1989, An-Nahda candidates attracted tremendous support 
for the party’s ideals, gaining a position as the opposition.169 Although An-Nahda’s 
application to be a political party had been turned down, its candidates stood as 
independents and won 15 percent of the total vote, with up to 40 percent in major cities 
including Tunis. However, instead of being admitted to parliament the An-Nahda 
independents were arrested on suspicion of attempting to overthrow the government. 170 
In summary, while An-Nahda presented itself as a non-violent political party, it was 
implicated in clashes with security forces, accused by planning to overthrow of the 
government and replacing it with an Islamic state. In reaction, Tunisian government 
declared that An-Nahda was illegal. 
It was perceived that Al-Qaeda did not succeed in attracting the Tunisian youth 
despite the exploding situation in the neighboring Algeria at that time. Based on its 
security force’s efforts, Tunisia was still safe up to the end of December 2006, In January 
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2007, a terrorist threat appeared. This threat was apparent after dismantling an armed 
group of thirty people in quasi-totality of the Tunisian with only one Mauritanian.171 
The group was directed by a former policeman, thirty-six years of age, named 
Lassaad Sassi. He resigned many years earlier for insubordination; after that, he escaped 
Tunisia in the beginning of 1990. He followed the course typical of all Afghans 
combatants then. He joined Bosnia, Chechen, Afghanistan then return to Italy. Until May 
2001, he was a director of a jihadist cell in Milan, Italy. It was reported that this cell 
provided false passports, military clothing and money to suspicious organization 
members in order to facilitate their travel and finance bloody operations in Italy or 
elsewhere.172 However, by the starting point of the investigations and almost everywhere 
after the attempts of the September 11, 2001, Sassi feared being captured, so he escaped 
from Italy. He likely took refuge in the Algerian mountains or in the desert near of the 
Mali frontiers or Niger, where his previous Afghans fighters were maneuvering. Sassi 
improved his use of the weapons and the explosives, and participated in some attacks in 
the Sahara against Algerian, or regional targets such as in Mauritania in 2005.173  
Sassi’s group arrived close to Grombalia, a small city not far from Tunis (30klms 
of Tunis), without awakening the soupcons. Then they installed their training camp and, 
no more than three months later, were able to recruit about twenty Tunisian young people 
and start to train them on how to use automatic weapons and the handling of the 
explosives. 174    
The targets believed to be the aim of the group were the American and the Great 
Britain embassies, as well as of the diplomats and the tourist sites in Hammamet, about 
50klms south Tunis.  After the terrorist group plan was dismantled, it was condemned by 
all the Tunisian society in addition to the international community. It was claimed only 
on an Islamist Web site, the Youth of Tawhid and Jihad in Tunisia, which declared a 
jihad on President Ben Ali, accusing him of harming Muslims in general and Muslim 
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women in particular by not allowing them to wear headscarves. Tunisia and other Muslim 
countries striving to enhance women’s rights have been confronted by extremist 
organizations that consider these practices “un-Islamic.”175  In the same context, Guidere 
pointed out that the Youth of Tawhid and Jihad in Tunisia issued on January 6, 2007, the 
following communiqué: 
These young have sacrificed what they had dearer to challenge the régime 
that has dared to take on our sisters of it. The Moslem in Tunisia are 
victims of a wave of oppression because of their head scarves and the 
Tunisian youngsters are forced to shave their beard. The Tunisian regime 
has to know that will finish in hell .We will fight them without relaxation 
until they remove their hands of our veiled sisters and they quit their 
aggressions...176 
Many believed that despite its announcement that the GSPC was aligned with Al-
Qaeda and the name of the GSPC became AQIM, the Tunisian activist group was and 
still is the moderate group in North African countries. After the mentioned claim by the 
Youth of Tawhid and Jihad in Tunisia, it was felt also that the group probably used 
Algeria only as safe haven and a training area.  There was no evidence confirming that 
the Tunisian group was ordered by the AQIM to carry out bloody operations in Tunisian 
territory, which confirms that there was no clear organizational link between the two 
groups. It was possible that an ideological link could probably exist between the two 
groups based on the Salafiya strategy that allows the use of violence to reach a political 
goal. 
In its domestic situation, Tunisia is considered safe compared to all the North 
African countries. The Tunisian government’s consciousness of the youth ambitions, 
embarked on a plan to address the country’s socio-economic needs planning investment 
and employment opportunities. The government of Tunisia continued to place a high 
priority on combating extremism and terrorism. In addition to using security and law 
enforcement measures, the Tunisian government pursued a variety of economic and 
social programs aimed at addressing the underlying challenges that can contribute to the 
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spread of extremism. The Tunisian government actively prevented the formation of 
terrorist groups inside Tunisia, including prohibiting the formation of religious-based 
political parties and groups that it believed would pose a terrorist threat. 
B. THE MOROCCAN RADICAL GROUP 
Several small Islamist organizations started to rise between the 1960s and 1970s, 
mainly on university campuses. The principal organizations were: Al-Islamiya (the 
Islamic Association), Al-Adl Wal Tanmiya (the Justice Organization) and al-Adl Wal 
Ihsane (Justice and Spirituality). According to Shahin 1997, the circumstances that 
galvanized the rise of the mentioned organizations are the high unemployment, 
inadequate social services and a rapidly growing population has inevitably led many 
Moroccans feeling disenfranchised and dissatisfied. 177  
Despite the Casablanca attacks in 2003, which left many victims in its aftermath: 
44 killed and several wounded, this present research will focus only on the analysis of the 
operations carried out in 2007 by  the Moroccan Islamic Combat  Group (GICM: French 
acronym as: Groupe Islamique Combatant marocain). The author will try to identify 
through the analysis of the attacks attempts, any clue confirming its links with AQIM or 
the other North African radical groups. 
Similar to the other North African activist groups, the GICM was initially 
established in the late 1990s by Moroccans who had fought the former Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan. The GICM was headed by Abdelkrim Al-Medjati until he was killed in a 
shootout with security forces in Saudi Arabia in 2005.178It was believed that the initial 
role of the GICM was to provide logistical support to Al-Qaeda operatives when they 
passed through Morocco to recruit followers for waging bloody operations against any 
vulnerable target, such as the Madrid bombing in 2004.179 It was also pointed out that 
Morocco was the first country in North Africa targeted by Al-Qaeda to recruit fighters for 
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Iraq (100 fighters in 2006).180 But, according to Sinjar181 2008, Morocco was among the 
first Foreign Fighters provider for Iraqi’s front after Libya and Algeria, as shown in the 
Map in Appendix I. 
On March 6, 2007, the Moroccan securities services arrested a military chief of 
the GICM, Saad Houssaini, in a cybercafé.182 At the time of the arrest, the Moroccan 
police did not know what the real objective of Houssaini was.  But the local chief of the 
GICM in Casablanca named Abdel Aziz Bin Zine as the suspect; he was arrested on 
Marsh 11, 2007, after being located by intercepting his cell phone calls. At the beginning 
of Abdel Aziz Bin Zine’s cross-examination, the Moroccan investigators believed that he 
was a key person for one or several operations that were going to be led against several 
objectives. They realized that Abdel Aziz Bin Zine would have given the orders for two 
GICM members, Abdelfatteh Alraydi (23) and Youssef khoudry, (18) to explode 
themselves on March 11, 2007, against selected targets.183   
The two youngsters were finally ready on March 11, 2007, as a “D” day to play 
suicide bombers. They were equipped with exploding belts. They were waiting all day for 
a phone call from Abdel Aziz Bin Zine, but they did not get the call because the police 
had already arrested him. The two kamikazes were worried and they had doubt, 
especially after being unable to contact Abdel Aziz Bin Zine via his has cell phone, 
which he did not answer.184   
At 9 p.m. on March 11, 2007, Abdelfatteh Alraydi and Youssef khoudry entered 
Faiz cybercafé, close to the Boulevard Al Andalus in Casablanca, in order to see if they 
had already received an e-mail from Abdel Aziz Bin Zine.   
The Moroccan police reported that there had been only three people in the cyber 
coffeehouse: the manager Fayez and two other customers who were lively with chatter on 
MSN. The two kamikazes settled before a computer, but they did not have anything 
suspicious, other than each carried a jacket that appeared bigger than their size, as if they 
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wanted to hide things in it.   After a few minutes, they moved from the first station to a 
second one after realizing initially that the first one did not work very well. After shifting 
to a second computer, they had the same problem because the Internet forums that they 
wanted to visit were blocked automatically each time they tried to be connected. 
Blocking this kind of Web site was and still is a security measure imposed by the 
Moroccan securities services in all cyber cafés after the Casablanca bombing in 2003.185   
The Manager Mohamed Fayez possessed a control screen behind his counter that 
allows him to follow the activity of the computer users and allows him to verify and 
intervene to unblock the system in case of a mistake or a breakdown of the computer. 
But, based on his first feeling that Abdelfatteh Alraydi and Youssef Khoudry appeared 
suspicious and were strangers to the district, he did not unblock the computer.186  
So, after several unsuccessful attempts, the two men became so nervous and 
started to hit the computer keyboard. At that time, the manager intervened, protesting, but 
the tone went up and the two men got ready to leave and refused to pay, arguing that they 
could not use the computers.   
The manager Fayez closed and locked the door of the store and called the police. 
Everybody was locked inside the cyber coffeehouse. The tension was at its zenith, as one 
reported. In order to avoid falling into the hands of the police, one of the two kamikazes 
hurried to the floor of the store and triggered his explosive load, ravaging the inside of 
the cyber cafe. According to the witnesses reporting to the Moroccans police, the first 
kamikaze shouted with a high voice, “Dying better than falling between the police’s 
hands.” 187   
The other kamikaze withdrew his belt of explosives and used it to break the door 
of the cyber coffeehouse while hoping to flee before the arrival of the police. But he was 
severely wounded and burned his face. After that, it was difficult to recognize him. 
Despite his miserable status, he ran away from the cyber café.  He was stopped by the 
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police at Sidi Othman hospital in Casablanca later in the same day. His confessions 
allowed the Moroccans security services to recover the other members of the cell only a 
few hours before they were to carrying out bloody operations on April 11, 2007. 
In order to understand what was behind the March and April 11, 2007, 
Casablanca kamikaze operations, it is important to focus on the first cyber cafe kamikaze, 
Abdelfateh Al-Raydi, and analyze his background and his environment to explore his 
reasons for behaving as a suicide bomber. Since the age of 18, Abdelfateh Al-Raydi had 
been a militant of the Moroccan salafiya Jihadiya, was condemned to five years of jail, 
and was accused of having ties with the performers of Casablanca attacks.  
Released from jail by the end of 2005, Abdelfateh Al-Raydi got married and 
became the father of a small boy in February of 2007. The Moroccan regime believed 
that having Abdelfateh Al-Raydi stay in jail would calm him, but the result was the 
opposite. He became more radical. His determination was to sacrifice himself as the only 
honorable solution. Abdelfateh Al-Raydi, descended of the shantytown Douar of Skouila, 
was without a job and he was, as some of “Martyrdom” was, seeing himself without 
promise or opportunity. 
Based on an intelligence source, Abdelfateh Al-Raydi was inspired by another 
Moroccan GICM leader, Saad El Houssaini. He was born in Meknes in 1968, had a deep 
knowledge in chemistry that allowed him to perform and to teach how to make artificial 
bombs. He had an academic foundation in chemistry, which allowed him to lead the 
Islamic group combatants in Morocco. That is why he was known by the chemist of the 
GICM. 188    
The majority of the GICM members participated in Afghanistan war, and they 
share the same Salafist Al-Qaeda ideology, which allows the use of violence to reach a 
political goal. But the nature of their targets diverges: Al-Qaeda’s goal is “The far 
enemy,” such as the USA and the West in general and their interest is in the Muslim 
countries. By contrast, the GICM was targeting “the near enemy” by fighting the 
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Moroccan régime and royalty.189  Due to the stern control and unfair Moroccan régime 
and its indiscriminate oppression, many of the GICM members took shelter in the 
mountains Algeria to escape the kingdom’s security forces and to be with the 
GSPC/AQIM in the desert regions and the mountains difficult to access. There was no 
indication proving that the GICM was under the authority of the group Algerian 
GSPC/AQIM. In addition, the reasons that were behind the operations of the kamikaze 
were completely socio-economic. The kamikaze operations actors felt themselves 
disenfranchised and saw that sacrificing their life to get rid of their unsupportable life and 
take vengeance on the unfair Moroccan régime was good. They perceived that the 
government was unable to provide the vital social services to the poor.190   
Understanding the current and potential threat of terrorism to the region, it is 
essential to focus on the radicalization process as experienced in Morocco. As mentioned 
previously, the success of terror organizations is determined by their ability to adapt to 
changing circumstances and to use specific circumstances for their own advantage. 
Morocco’s vulnerability to the terrorism is increased by poor socio-economic conditions 
concentrated in particular areas. While it is important in this step, to emphasize that not 
all the people in similar conditions of unemployment, illiteracy and isolation will turn to 
terrorism. 
Yet, the aborted kamikaze operations in Morocco have proven that only poor 
socioeconomic conditions influence a person’s susceptibility to be radicalized and no 
evident external influence from the AQIM. 191  
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C.  THE LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP – LIFG – (AL-JAMA’A AL-
ISLAMIYA AL-MUQATILAH BI LIBYA) 
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group LIFG is a movement jihadist, emerged by the 
1980s in the middle of the Arabian combatants that appeared at that time. The Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group LIFG, was officially created in 1995. The Libyan group counted 
in its ranks besides the elders of Libyan Afghan fighters who participated in the 
Afghanistan war against Russia, some other members from region countries (Chad, Mali, 
Niger, and Nigeria). The group started its revolt against the régime of Mouammar 
Kaddafi in 1990 then took the East of the country as a safe haven to avoid the Libyan 
regime repression.  When the LIFG started to increase its struggle against the Libyan 
regime in 1980, the regime reacted by a ferocious repression, which forced the group to 
be implanted in the East of Libya. It was pointed out that Kaddafi gave the order to his 
security forces to kill LIFG members as “dogs,” as mentioned by Guidere in 2007—
(Abattre les chiens islamistes comme des chiens : kill the Islamist Dog as killing 
Dogs).192 
After their initial unsuccessful attempt to face their domestic regime in the 1980s, 
the LIFG participated in the Afghan war, as well as the other radical groups in the region. 
It was perceived that the participation of  LIFG combatants in the jihad against the 
Soviets in Afghanistan increased their radicalization .Based on their skills, the LIFG 
Afghans have planned several unsuccessful attempts to murder the supreme leader 
Kaddafi, but he responded with more and more wild repression.     
It was reported that in addition to his air force, Kaddafi pushed also on the 
revolutionary committees to sweep the LIFG camps and massacre the leftist fighters.193 
By the 1990s, about 3,000 Islamic activists were arrested after being accused of plotting 
to assassinate Kaddafi. This later described LIFG members as being worse than cancer 
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and AIDS.194 He (Kaddafi) was publicly excoriating the various Islamic opposition 
groups as being guilty of “heresy/atheism” as known in Arabic by “Zandaqa,” and 
accused all LIFG members of plotting against religion and denounced them. 195    
Consequently, the police operations forced several LIFG chiefs to leave Libya for 
some foreign countries. However, a main portion of the militants remained in place, 
disseminated in the Desert Mountains of the South. It is necessary to mention that the 
major part of the country covers one of the most arid regions of the Sahara, which allows 
LIFG elements to find shelter there in places such as caves.  
And, as it was mentioned in the previous chapter, a number the LIFG fighters 
chose to join the Camp of the Algerian group (GIA) to escape the repression of the 
Libyans and to take benefit of the GIA skills. But, it was reported that LIFG members did 
not enjoy their stay in the GIA camps in Algeria under the leadership of the GIA leader 
Antar Zouabri then Zitouni who was  accused of murdering an LIFG leader (Abou Sakhar 
Al-Libi).196 
In June 1996, the LIFG issued a statement acknowledging that it had been 
engaged in “supporting the Jihad against the apostate in Algeria” and the Armed Islamic 
Group Algeria “based on the clear and scrupulous path that this group adopted 
throughout the years.”  However, the LIFG also announced that it was immediately 
halting all such “support and aid” rendered to the GIA.197  
The Algerian radical group leader’s attitude obliged the LIFG combatants to 
change their camp probably to an uncontrolled area in Niger and Mali. In addition, this 
situation kept the LIFG in a non-comfortable situation, in unsafe maneuver camps. After 
September 2001, and facing their inferior situation, some local chiefs of the LIFG tried to 
get support from the central command of Al-Qaeda. The link was in particular with two 
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high persons responsible of Al-Qaeda of origin Libyan: Abou Faraj Al-Libi al, then Abou 
Yahya all two fervid partisans of the global jihad and a unification of the jihadist’s 
movements in Maghreb.198     
This new strategy opted by the GICL has been taken seriously by Kaddafi and let 
him join, at the cost of enormous concessions, the Western camp in 2005 and allowed a 
close collaboration of his security services with the secret European and American 
services. In a sign of good will, Washington immediately added the Libyan group (GICL) 
to the black list of the movement terrorists.199     
Due to the continuously repressive politics followed by the Libyan régime, 
several of the LIFG militants were encircled and massacred in the Libyan mountainous 
regions close to Chad North borders (Zone Tibesti). These massacres weakened the group 
and let certain of its spiritual chiefs, such as the sheik Miftah Al_Dawadh and the sheik 
Abdel Wahhab, call for a revision of the GICL doctrine and follow the model of the 
Egyptians Moslem brotherhood. But, the LIFG’s young generation opposed the initiative 
to stop the violence initiated by the Libyan régime.200     
The Libyans new generation took over while their historic chiefs had been jailed. 
By the end of 2006, the LIFG took the opportunity of the fifth birthday of the 9/11 to 
issue its communiqué to display its position and its objectives. By its communiqué, the 
LIFG accused the Kaddafi régime of “collaborating with the strangers, apostasy, liar and 
falsifier….waging a continuous war against Allah and the believers.”201 All these reasons 
justify, according to the LIFG, the armed struggle led against the Libyan régime but they 
seemed counterproductive.      
On the pretext of giving the international community a sign of his human rights 
respect, Kaddafi called for the reconciliation, but the LIFG group denied any kind of 
reconciliation with the Libyan regime. In addition, the LIFG emphasized that it did not 
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need to give up and surrender after depositing the weapons as proposed by the Libyan 
Leader. The group answered the Libyan régime with a message that the suggested 
strategy of reconciliation and negotiation did not work in Algeria where its régime tried 
to do everything in order to get rid of its Radical Islamist (AQIM).202   
The GICL war against the Libyan regime continued. The LIFG leaders affirmed 
that there were two sides or two positions that were irreconcilable: first, sincere believers 
(the group militants) and second the apostate collaborators (the régime supports).203 
Consequently, the LIFG refused all kind of moderate solutions, including any with the 
Western enemy: “No secret agreements and no negotiations in hiding place.”204 The 
LIFG accused the Libyan regime to integrate the LIFG members in its (Libyan regime) 
corrupted political system while giving some guaranties to the West.205  
The LIFG reaffirmed its initial objective, “The institution of an Islamic state in 
Libya and the application of the Shari’a law.”206 The LIFG recalled that its engagement 
in the armed struggle against the Libyan regime was neither recent nor temporary, “We 
are convinced that the jihad is not a transient phase… We are using all our forces to reach 
the victory or the martyrdom.”207 It was noted that the LIFG finished its messages with a 
desperate call to Allah in order to decimate Kaddafi and his regime. But it was and still 
perceived that Kaddafi decimated the LIFG members and sympathizers which forced the 
GICL survivors to escape then join the Algerian radical group (GSPC).   
The LIFG is one of the most enterprising of the region because of its direct 
contacts with hierarchy of Al-Qaeda. It was reported in an audio communiqué on Internet 
one month after the official creation of Al-Qaeda in Maghreb, February 20, 2007, Abou 
Yahya Al-Libi evoked the issue of the Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian physician 
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condemned in December 2006, to have, according to the Libyan justice, voluntary 
inoculated the virus of the AIDS into some children in Libyan a hospital. The 
condemnation triggered the protests of the international community and the defense made 
a judgment call in May 2007, to save their lives and to free them.208     
Related to this case, Abou Yahiya Al-Libi issued a communiqué of 17 minutes, 
accusing Kadhafi directly of having covered up the contamination of more than 400 
children by the virus of the AIDS, “How can these killers perpetrate this crime against a 
number so important of innocent children without the knowledge of the Libyan tyrant, 
Kaddafi?209     
So, despite its long struggle and skills (111 fighters of its militants joined the 
Iraqis front),210 the LIFG is still unable to realize its objectives, mainly after the 
involvement of the Libyan leader in global war on terrorism. The Libyan Radical 
perceived gave up after admitting the reconciliation with its regime. It has been more 
than two years since talks started between the Libyan authorities and the imprisoned 
leaders of the LIFG (Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya al-Muqatilah Bi Libya). As both sides 
acknowledge past mistakes, there are finally signs that the longtime antagonists may be 
getting closer to reconciliation. The process will rely in part on the LIFG’s renunciation 
of acting against the Libyan regime. It will need to renounce its merger with any foreign 
radical group such as al-Qaeda central or regionally with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM), even for a short period.211  
In addition, soon after the talks began, the leaders in exile of the LIFG suddenly 
started to come forward, after years of silence, to support the imprisoned leaders in the 
discussions with the Libyan government. First, there was a letter issued by Abdullah 
Mansour, a former leader of the LIFG in the United Kingdom and a member of its 
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religious committee.212 Then there was an unsigned statement by a group of “former and 
present” members of the LIFG in the United Kingdom.213 Both the letter and the 
statement had one aim in common: supporting the talks between the imprisoned LIFG 
leaders and the Libyan authorities. Both rejected the merger of the LIFG with Al-Qaeda 
that was announced by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Laith Al-Libi in October 2007. 
The statement from former and present LIFG members was clear in saying that Abu Laith 
al-Libi lacked the proper authority to merge the LIFG with Al-Qaeda. It went on to say 
that the LIFG as an organization was never part of Ben Laden’s global war on the West  
and USA (the Far enemy)214 as perceived, but  always had a “local aim  or domestic 
objective.”215 
As a response to the positive sign given by the LIFG to the Libyan regime, it was 
reported by Al-Hayat Newspaper published on July 19, 2009, that Colonel Qaddafi has 
issued instructions to the authorities to assist those who have been deceived by groups 
pretending to have an Islamic agenda, but who have now become mature enough to know 
that they were wrong in following such groups, to return to Libya without any fear of 
being harmed. The statement went on to say that those misguided Islamists (according to 
Kaddafi) in exile should be helped in their reintegration with Libyan society and in 
finding employment. It urged those still in the different foreign countries wishing to come 
back to Libya to contact Libyan embassies from where an arrangement can be made to 
repatriate them. The message was clear to the LIFG leaders in exile, “If you want to be 
part of the peace in Libya, return to your country, admit that you were misguided and do 
not try to make the LIFG equal in any way to the government.”216 
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Based on this analysis, it is clear that the LIFG members were forced to join the 
GIA then the GSPC and probably the AQIM in order only to escape the harsh Libyan 
régime. But as mentioned previously, the LIFG leader Abou Sakher Al-Libi refused to 
obey the GIA leaders that caused his death. This event forced the GICL to cut off any 
kind of link with the GIA. It was pointed out also that the LIFG suffered from a lack of 
strong leadership, cohesion and coordination217. In addition, the LIFG already confirmed 
that it did not have any links with foreigners groups such as Al-Qaeda or AQIM or any 
other radical group. It was reported recently that, in September 2009, the imprisoned 
leadership of the LIFG, considered a prominent jihadist group allied with Al-Qaeda, 
wrote and released a revision document over 400 pages long, in which they renounced 
the use of violence to change political situations.218 So, in this author’s assessment, that 
maybe only an ideological link could exist between the two Algerian and Libyan groups, 
but each of the groups, LIFG and AQIM, has its own national objectives in their relative 
countries.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A.  SUMMATION  
After aligning with Al-Qaeda in 2007, the Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC) shifted its name to the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM). Consequently, this name shifting captured the world’s attention and led several 
scholars and policymakers to ask several questions: What is behind this emergence? Is it 
a signal of weakness or strength? How is it possible to understand the two organizations’ 
real links? What was the level of threat? 
This study investigated three hypotheses: (1) this merger is merely an ideological 
one; (2) this merger is ideological, operational, and material; (3) this merger is merely a 
rebranding of a failing organization that needed to survive. Looking at the history and 
evolution of Algerian Islamism, from the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the 
GIA, to the GSPC and AQIM, it appears that hypothesis 3 is the closest to reality and 
thus the best explanation of the merger between GSPC and Al-Qaeda. 
The ever-growing radicalization of Algerian Islamists has its roots in the conflict 
between the state and Islamists. The repression of the FIS produced the GIA and the 
interaction between the GIA and the Algerian regime had resulted in the massacre of 
thousands of civilians, which in turn produced intense internal divisions and fights within 
this faction. The GIA experienced a split in 1998 with the formation of the Salafist Group 
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The GSPC attempted to regain support by focusing 
its objective on the Algerian regime, the Algerian security forces, and on attacking 
Western assets. 
The split between the GSPC and the GIA meant the former’s rejection of the 
doctrine of collective excommunication of Muslims (takfir al-Mujtama) and the 
indiscriminate killing of civilians. Despite its efforts to reconstruct and mobilize the 
Algerian society to recruit more militants to its fronts, the GSPC failed in its new strategy 
because it was too little, too late—the Algerian public has largely turned against the 
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radical Islamists. Additional factors contributed to the failure of the GSPC: loss of any 
international sympathy after 9/11; diversion of Algerian recruits to the war in Iraq in the 
form of foreign fighters; and the amnesty and reconciliation programs advanced by the 
Algerian regime in which many fighters and leaders decided to give up and surrender 
themselves to the Algerian military. 
In order to survive, the GSPC reached out to Al-Qaeda’s networks and changed 
its name to Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb land (AQIM) as a last ditch effort to attract 
support, financing, and legitimacy. Analysis of all the operations carried out since 2007 
in North Africa shows that there is little evidence confirming any real operational links 
between Al-Qaeda and the different radical groups in North Africa such as AQIM, 
Tunisia’s radical networks, the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM) and the Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). To be sure, these groups share similar ideological 
precepts, but this is far from direct operational ties and cooperation. 
It is evident that each group was acting separately according to its national 
contexts and objectives. There was little evidence confirming that AQIM is representing 
more than an Algerian radical group. Its targeting remains focused on the Algerian 
regime and its forces as well as foreign interests in Algeria, which has been a consistent 
strategy of radical Islamists bent on depriving the Algerian state of economic stability 
and growth.  
According to regional experts and the author’s assessment, AQIM does not 
represent a major threat to the U.S. and Western interests outside Algeria. It is possible 
that AQIM’s network of small isolated groups in the camps of the Sahara desert could 
grow and increase their exploitation of the porous borders shared by Algeria, Mali, 
Mauritania and Niger. Such developments could threaten foreign nationals as well as 
regional and foreign interests due to acts of kidnapping, targeting tourists, and smuggling 
weapons, drugs, and people across borders. This concern is real, but it does not warrant 
the exceedingly alarming statements by American and European policymakers. Desert 
camps mainly in the virtually ungoverned regions in Mali and Niger (see map in 
Appendix 2) may be used to train fighters for attacking American and European interests  
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in North Africa or in Europe, but these attacks are constrained by AQIM’s national 
objectives as well as by strong states with formidable security services intent on fighting 
their radical Islamists.     
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
After two decades of repressing its radical group, the Algerian government was 
unable to totally defeat it. It is time to take appropriate courses of action to deal with this 
situation by the Algerian government first, by the neighboring countries and second by 
the international community. 
The Algerian regime has to establish a constitutional review process, designed to 
produce proposals for restructuring the political system to provide for genuine 
transparency, greater accountability and free political participation of all parties. As part 
of this process, the role of the Algerian army within the political system and as an 
integral component of the political structure must be redefined. In addition, it is necessary 
to engage in a public and transparent dialogue with all Islamist groups. 
Resolving Algeria’s issue effectively will also require new thinking and a new 
approach on the part of the international community. The European states and the 
European Union have an especially important stake in the outcome of the instability.  
American and European attitudes towards Algeria have tended to put a premium on 
maintaining the stability of the regime and containing violence, without paying sufficient 
attention to the root causes of the conflict. A strong Algerian military has been seen as 
the best means of keeping a lid on unrest, avoiding massive outward migration and the 
possible spill-over of terrorist violence into Europe itself. This would preserve Europe’s 
supply of crude oil and natural gas. For their part, several European states have largely 
accepted that they have no role to play in determining Algeria’s future political 
complexion. This approach has been only partially successful. With a few exceptions, 
violence has not come ashore in Europe, but has been contained within Algeria; there has 
been no massive influx of Algerian refugees; and oil and gas has continued to flow. 
However, as this report demonstrates, the situation remains highly precarious. The 
country remains in crisis and violence is escalating again. 
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For that reason, the European countries, mainly France, Italy and Spain have to 
support a dialogue between the Algerian government and the Islamists by providing 
facilitation and a venue. The European countries’ role is very important in encouraging 
the Algerian government, applying good governance and respecting the human rights. In 
addition, they could support the political reconstruction process in Algeria; they could 
support the growth of a civil society and measures that will end civil violence. 
In addition to the European countries’ efforts, the Algerian neighbors have  a vital 
role overcoming all their conflicts and improving coordination with regional neighbors to 
eliminate smuggling routes, cut off any kind of illegal financing, training camps, and 
terrorist safe havens. The main issue within the Maghreb region is between Algeria and 
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Figure 1.   Foreign Fighters by Country of Origin according to the Combating Terrorism 
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Figure 2.   The uncontrolled area in the Sahel used as a safe Haven by the AQIM militants 
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